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Abstract
Towards usable and ﬁne-grained security for HTTPS with
middleboxes
Abhimanyu Khanna
Over the past few years, technology ﬁrms have inlined end-to-end encryption for their
services and implored for increased in-network functionality. Most ﬁrms deploy TLS
and middleboxes by performing man-in-the-middle (MITM) of network sessions. In
practice, there are no oﬃcial guidelines for performing MITM and often several tweaks
are used resulting in less secure systems. TLS was designed for exactly two parties
and introducing a third party by doing MITM breaks TLS and the security beneﬁts
it oﬀers.
With increasing debate in ﬁnding a clean way to deploy middleboxes with TLS,
our work surveys the literature and introduces a benchmark based on the Usability-
Deployability-Security (UDS) framework for evaluating existing TLS middlebox in-
terception proposals. Our benchmark encompasses and helps understand the current
beneﬁts, solutions and challenges in the existing solutions for incorporating TLS with
middleboxes. We perform a comparative and qualitative evaluation for the schemes
and summarize the results in a single table. We propose: Triraksha, an alterna-
tive to the currently deployed middlebox interception models. Triraksha provides
a packet inspection service for end-to-end encrypted connections while maintaining
ﬁne-grained conﬁdentiality for end points. We evaluate a prototype implementation
of our scheme on local and remote servers and show that the overhead in terms of
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latency and throughput is minimal. Our scheme is easily deployable as only a few
software additions are made at the middlebox and client end.
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With advances in Internet technology, there is increased usage of middleboxes in
networks [59, 80, 24]. Functionalities oﬀered by middleboxes like ﬁrewalls, NATs,
proxies provide a wide range of services beneﬁting end users and network operators.
Services like caching, compression, prefetching and load balancing improves page load
time, data usage and reduces consumption of resources [39, 82, 43, 59] on end points.
Network Intrusion Detection systems (IDS)/Intrusion Prevention systems (IPS) and
network scanners like Snort [16], Suricata [17] and Bro [63] prevent network attacks
and help detect malware/viruses in packet payloads. Parental ﬁltering devices and
policy enforcement appliances [13, 74] help mandate and enforce policies on browsing
of network traﬃc and data usage. Middleboxes have become an essential component
[83, 50, 23] in the network of many organizations and enterprises. However, trends
[72, 70, 69, 62, 6] also show that usage of middleboxes is associated with high cost,
complex management and a host of privacy concerns.
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Recent data breaches and increasing concerns for user’s privacy [48, 84, 67, 79, 2,
33, 77] have led to increased use of end-to-end encryption. This trend has led to
the widespread adoption of web servers using HTTPS as the norm to communicate
with clients. It was forecasted that 70% of global Internet traﬃc will be encrypted
in 2016, with many networks exceeding 80% [22, 60, 58]. TLS (Transport Layer
Security) has become an intrinsic component of HTTPS services and provides for a
secure communication channel between a client and server. TLS was designed for
two parties and ensures the following properties for end points: entity authentication,
data integrity and data secrecy. Middleboxes, which perform in-network functionality
at various points in the network [58, 44] do not work well with end-to-end encrypted
sessions. Use of TLS pushes any in-network functionality employed by a network
operator to be done at the application layer of the end points. Services like packet
inspection and payload manipulation cannot be performed as the middlebox does
not have access to the packet payload. The very beneﬁts oﬀered by HTTPS are in
variance and block the essential in-network functionality of middleboxes.
To get around end-to-end encryption and enable middlebox functionality, middle-
box systems are deployed in an insecure method called ‘Split TLS’ [59]. The middle-
box is placed as a gateway in the network and simply performs MITM (man in the
middle) for all TLS connections. The middlebox pipes data between the client and
the server in two separate TLS connections. Split TLS though widely deployed, has
several downsides emanating from its design. A major downside is that the client
has to trust the middlebox to securely connect to the server on its behalf. Further,
the middlebox has complete access over the data that was meant only for the end
points and can read/modify it. Split TLS violates the end-to-end security guarantees
of TLS. This is a cause for concern considering the recent number of data breaches
by hackers. A number of issues were recorded and surveyed in [58, 44] expressing
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privacy concerns for users.
Using end-to-end encryption with in-network functionality of middleboxes is a re-
cent topic of interest and has caused for increasing debate [19] in the community.
Many RFCs and academic proposals [59, 47, 73, 72, 64, 55, 53] attempt to construct
a protocol that allows middleboxes to exist side-by-side with end-to-end encryption.
Recent proposals like mcTLS [59], Blindbox[73] and Embark [49] discuss, raise issues
of data permissions and privileges associated with a middlebox in a TLS connection
and attempt to address these issues in their scheme. The schemes propose to extend
TLS, outsource in-network processing to cloud services and/or propose new searchable
encryption schemes. The privacy model in these schemes is stricter when compared to
Split TLS. Industrial eﬀorts by Akamai [42, 47], Google [64], Ericsson and AT&T [53]
also attempt to bring forward solutions to incorporate middlebox infrastructure with
end-to-end encryption. However, the solutions in the existing literature still suﬀers
from limitations. A majority of the schemes are not compatible with the server and
are hence less likely to be adopted. Schemes have varying assumptions on privileges
for the middlebox and usability for end users. The approach taken by a few schemes
incur overhead [75, 52] that may not be suitable for all environments like mobile net-
works and in networks of content service providers. Further, many of the proposed
schemes are not evaluated extensively over real world data points. A good solution
to the problem is yet to exist and the topic is very active with various discussions in
the IETF, TLS and middlebox community.
1.2 Contributions
In this work, we begin with a survey of the literature with the aim of understanding:
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1. The problems and challenges of deploying middleboxes with end-to-end en-
crypted sessions in current proposals.
2. The properties required for a middlebox to work securely with end-to-end en-
cryption.
We propose a benchmark for comparative evaluation of the existing literature. The
benchmark deﬁnes 12 properties ﬁtting to the UDS (Usability-Deployability-Security)
framework and is used to evaluate 12 proposals from the academia and industry. The
results were summarized and placed in a comparative table. We further discuss and
demonstrate with each property how and why the schemes are rated as such. The
systematical exercise done in our study establishes and provides for insight into the
challenges, problems and solutions for use of middleboxes with end-to-end encrypted
sessions. Based on a comprehensive survey and understanding of using middleboxes
with TLS, we present Triraksha: an alternative scheme to Split TLS. Triraksha uses
existing infrastructure to securely incorporate a packet inspection service for TLS
connections in enterprise environments. Our scheme Triraksha achieves the following:
1. It requires minimal changes at end points and is deployable with existing in-
frastructure.
2. Introduces ﬁne-grained security for a client taking part in a TLS connection
with a server.
3. An in-network packet inspection service.
4. Incorporates the security properties of TLS and has a stronger privacy model
compared to Split TLS.
We implemented Triraksha by adding software modiﬁcations only on the middlebox
and the client. Our evaluation shows that Triraksha incurs little overhead when
compared with a regular end-to-end TLS connection.
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In summary, our contributions are as follows:
1. A benchmark based on the UDS framework to assess the beneﬁts of a scheme
that attempts to incorporate middleboxes in end-to-end encrypted sessions.
2. A comprehensive study of the existing literature and a comparative evaluation
of the schemes using our benchmark.
3. Triraksha: a practical alternative scheme to Split TLS for inspection of TLS
traﬃc in enterprise environments.
4. A prototype implementation of Triraksha in a controlled environment.
5. Strategies and discussion for extending Triraksha to future versions of the TLS
protocol and working under extended threat models.
1.3 Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 covers some necessary
background and literature related to this dissertation. In Chapter 3, we introduce
our benchmark based on the UDS framework; summarize the schemes and do an
evaluation of schemes with our benchmark. Chapter 4 discusses the threat model,
design, implementation details and evaluation of our scheme Triraksha. In Chapter




In this chapter, we discuss the TLS protocol, introduce middleboxes2, discuss a few
existing classiﬁcation techniques for middleboxes and summarize deployment of mid-
dleboxes in networks using Split TLS. The section establishes that middleboxes are
beneﬁcial and provides an overview on why it is necessary to work on a solution to
cleanly deploy middleboxes with a higher layer protocol like TLS.
2.1 Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol
The TLS protocol was designed to provide secure communication for a connection
between a client and a server. TLS provides conﬁdentiality and integrity of messages
for higher layer protocols like HTTP, IMAP, SMTP etc. The terms TLS and SSL are
often used interchangeably but the protocols diﬀer subtly. TLS 1.0 was the successor
to SSL 3.0 and the current version of TLS is 1.2 [37] which is also the most widely
deployed TLS version. Version 1.3 [38] is currently under development.
2Formal deﬁnition of the terms used throughout the paper are provided in the Appendix.
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TLS is placed at layer 5 in the TCP/IP [12] network stack and consists of the
handshake protocol and the record protocol. The handshake protocol is responsible
for setting up a secure session and establishing symmetric encryption keys between
the server and the client while the record protocol uses the symmetric encryption key
from the handshake protocol to do encryption and decryption of TLS record packets.
TLS packets are of four content types: handshake, cipher key exchange, application
data and alert. Each content type has its own header values and are summarized in
the Appendix. The TLS protocol is build on top of various cryptographic primitives
and tasks like key agreement, authentication, encryption and integrity protection.
The protocol allows the end points to choose from a list of algorithms to perform
these tasks. The collective selection of algorithms are referred to as a cipher suite.
An example of a cipher suite is TLS ECDHE RSA WITH AES 128 GCM SHA256
where ECDHE RSA is the key exchange algorithm, AES 128 GCM is the bulk en-
cryption algorithm and SHA256 is the message authentication code algorithm.
TLS ensures the following properties:
1. Entity authentication: An end point authenticates who it is communicating
with.
2. Payload conﬁdentiality : which allows only the two parties in the connection
access to the data sent between them.
3. Payload integrity : which provides for data integrity and authenticity of the
messages communicated (in transit) between the parties.
We summarize the handshake and the record protocol in the following subsection.
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2.1.1 The handshake protocol
The TLS handshake is responsible for establishing TLS session keys and authenti-
cating two end points in a connection. Figure 1 represents the TLS handshake done
using RSA. A TLS handshake is initiated by a TLS client with a ClientHello message.
The ClientHello contains information about the TLS version and a list of supported
cipher suites. The server responds with a ServerHello message containing the se-
lected cipher suite. The server also sends the server Certiﬁcate, ServerKeyExchange
and a ServerHelloDone message. The ServerHelloDone message indicates the end of
the transmission of the ServerHello. The client in turn sends a ClientKeyExchange,
ChangeCipherSpec and Finished message.
Figure 1: Example of a TLS handshake done using RSA.
The information in the Client/ServerKeyExchange messages are used to determine
the TLS session keys (TLS sessions keys are used for encryption of TLS application
data). The ChangeCipherSpec message indicates that all subsequent messages sent
between the endpoints would be encrypted. Following the Client Finished message,
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the server responds with the ServerChangeCipherSpec and Server Finished message.
The Finish message is a hash of the entire handshake and ensures that the previous
messages have not been tampered with. A variation to the TLS handshake involves
session resumption where the end points can resume a previously negotiated session.
2.1.2 The record protocol
The record protocol is used to transmit protocol messages. A TLS client takes mes-
sages from a higher layer and uses the cipher suite negotiated during the handshake
to encrypt the message. The TLS client based on the cipher suite usually computes a
MAC over the plaintext, pads the message to a ﬁxed block length and ﬁnally encrypts
it to get ciphertext. The ciphertext is wrapped with the protocol version, message
type and message length headers and passed to a lower network stack.
2.2 Middleboxes
2.2.1 Introduction
Middleboxes are units that stay in the network between two end points and perform
some functionality on the traﬃc by altering, inspecting, ﬁltering or transforming
it. Signiﬁcant changes have been made to the technology used in the Internet in
the last few years and with higher processing power of computers, performance and
security expectations from commercial services, content service providers and regu-
lar servers have increased [36, 25]. Middleboxes provide the necessary functionality
[83, 50] to meet them. Compared to the original architecture of the Internet [32]
which is based on the end-to-end principle and pushes functionality at end points,
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middleboxes provide functionality and increase resource eﬃciency in-network. Mid-
dleboxes helps the Internet grow into a market driven ecosystem [59]. Middleboxes
are widely deployed in networks of all sizes. All major Internet service providers,
content service providers, mobile carriers, enterprises use middlebox for a wide range
of services. Not all functionality transpired by middleboxes is desirable as there are
increasing privacy concerns [77, 33, 2] on how middleboxes handle traﬃc. However,
it is established that middleboxes are essential and provide the necessary resources
for end points to perform better on the stage [49, 82].
2.2.2 Middlebox taxonomy
RFC 3234 [32] introduces a taxonomy for middleboxes. The most common way to
classify a middlebox is a classic: “good versus bad” scenario. Some middleboxes
provide useful functionality while some are malicious and attempt to disrupt commu-
nication between the endpoints. Middleboxes are also classiﬁed at the protocol layer
depending on which layer they provide functionality in. mcTLS [59] depicts exam-
ples of application layer middleboxes and the permissions it needs for functionality
at the HTTP layer. The examples are a good representative of the most common
types of middleboxes in networks. They are: cache, compression, load balancing, IDS,
parental ﬁlter, packet pacer and WAN optimizer. They classify middleboxes into three
categories: value added services (users opt in for these middleboxes), administrator
mandated (helps enterprises/institutions to set policies) and unauthorized (not useful
for network or user). TLS-AUX [47] classiﬁes middleboxes into content aware and non
content aware services. Content aware services deal with the packet payload while
non content aware services usually work on the headers and other meta data associ-
ated with the connection. Middleboxes under the content aware services category can
access the plaintext data sent between the client and the server. Some examples are
10
an Intrusion detection systems, Intrusion prevention systems and content ﬁlters. In
our scheme Triraksha, we are interested in application layer middleboxes that provide
useful functionality such that the middlebox is capable of monitoring and inspecting
TLS traﬃc but not modifying it.
Middlebox operators and environment: We brieﬂy summarize the environ-
ment and the operators that run the middlebox services. In medium and small sized
networks like home/company networks, middleboxes which typically provide func-
tionality at an application layer are operated as proxies or application layer gateways
(ALGs) while middleboxes which provide functionality at IP layers and below com-
monly run as routers, ﬁrewalls and NAT (network address translator) devices. A
proxy is a device that relays application messages between two peers in the network.
Proxies are capable of terminating sessions with the client and the server, acting as
server to the end-host client and as client to the end-host server. Proxies are of two
types: forward proxy and reverse proxy. A forward proxy forwards requests from a
peer to another in the network while the reverse proxy is used as a front-end to con-
trol and protect access to a server on an network. Both forward and reverse proxies
are typically used to provide services like anonymity, compression, load balancing,
WAN optimization, SSL acceleration etc. Application layer gateways are entities
programmed to provide a speciﬁc set of services and are implemented as hardware
or software at the gateways in an network. ALGs may reside within the gateway
device or reside externally but communicating with the gateway through a protocol.
Contrary to proxies, ALGs do not terminate connections between its peers. ALGs
inspects or optionally modiﬁes application payload content to provide the middlebox
service and continue the ﬂow of application traﬃc as a network hop. In large scale
networks, middleboxes are collectively run at multiple points to provide a wide array
of functionality. The collective distributed infrastructure for middleboxes services in
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large scale networks are typically run as a CDN. A CDN has a large number of sur-
rogate servers in geographically diﬀerent locations. A website using a CDN service
would have its data replicated to the surrogated servers and when users access the web
site, they will be directed to the CDN and ﬁnally get the content from a nearby sur-
rogate server rather than the web site’s origin server. CDNs originally were designed
to reduce network latency but have evolved to provide services like DDoS protections
appliances and application layer ﬁrewalls.
2.2.3 Split TLS and why it breaks regular TLS
A naive and popular solution used to incorporate middlebox environments with TLS
is to place the middlebox transparently between the end points. The middlebox acts
as a certiﬁcate authority and provides a self signed root certiﬁcate for each client
in the network. The client installs this root certiﬁcate on his end and when the
client attempts to connect to a server, the middlebox intercepts the connection and
fabricates a brand new certiﬁcate for that server (the fabricated certiﬁcate is signed by
the key of the root certiﬁcate installed on the client computer). Since the fabricated
certiﬁcate is signed by a key that the client trusts, the client application will accept the
connection. A second TLS connection is opened with the server and the middlebox
then pipes the data between these two end points.
Problems stemming from Split TLS: Split TLS only works for middlebox
operators that explicitly install a root certiﬁcate on the end point (typically client
side). Split TLS is designed insecurely and breaks the security properties oﬀered by
TLS in the following ways:
1. Server authentication: The client as an end point does not authenticate the
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server. To a regular user, no certiﬁcate warning signs would be displayed for in-
valid server certiﬁcates on a browser because the browser accepts the certiﬁcate
signed by one in its trusted root directory. Further, the server is completely
unaware of the middlebox in the connection.
2. TLS negotiations: The client does not negotiate the TLS handshake parameters
with the server and has no security guarantees of the parameters negotiated
between the middlebox and the server.
3. Over privileged middlebox: The middlebox gains access and is capable of reading
and modify the data sent between the client and the server. Full disclosure of
user and server traﬃc increase risk of privacy leak in systems.
Adopting Split TLS leads the user to have a false sense of belief that the client is
communicating with the server when in-fact the client is transparently communicating
with the middlebox. The bottom line is that Split TLS brings about risk and results
in less secure systems. Despite its limitations this scheme is widely used because of
its ease of deployment.
In the subsequent chapters of this thesis, we propose our scheme: Triraksha, which
is an alternative to Split TLS and provides better security beneﬁts. We brieﬂy discuss
how Triraksha has better security beneﬁts over Split TLS. The Triraksha protocol
provides the following beniﬁts:
1. Server authentication: The client and the server perform a TLS handshake.
The middlebox does not participate in the TLS handshake. The client sees
the certiﬁcate of the server and trusts this certiﬁcate if it is signed by a root
certiﬁcate on the client computer.
13
2. TLS negotiations: Compared to Split TLS, where the middlebox negotiates the
TLS version and the ciphers for the connection with the server (the middlebox
may degrade the security of the TLS connection by using poor or broken ci-
phers). In Triraksha, the client sets the list of ciphers and TLS version to be
used for the connection.
3. Over privileged middlebox: Compared to Split TLS where the middlebox has
access to the whole traﬃc (the middlebox can modify traﬃc or do unwarranted
actions like insert ads etc.), In Triraksha, the client controls for which con-
nections the middlebox can read the traﬃc. The middlebox cannot modify
the traﬃc in Triraksha and maintains content integrity for the messages sent
between the client and the server.
2.2.4 The world of middleboxes with end-to-end encryption
In the previous section, we discussed that middleboxes are used with TLS using Split
TLS. However, this works for only middleboxes that have an close association with the
end points (as the end point installs a certiﬁcate from the middlebox). Middleboxes
that operate without such a relationship must reveal their presence explicitly. It is
possible for middleboxes to coexist with end-to-end encryption without solely relying
on the Split TLS model but they must get consent/be trusted by atleast an end point
of the connection (client or server). Trust and explicit presence of the middlebox are
two necessary properties required for a middlebox to coexist with end-to-end encryp-
tion. A middlebox that is not visible to an end point cannot be trusted by that end
point [40]. The world of middleboxes existing with end-to-end encrypted connections
are described in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Classiﬁcation of schemes for middleboxes coexisting with TLS.
The world described in Figure 2 contains the client (an end point that wants ser-
vice), the middlebox (which provides network functionality) and the server (the ser-
vice provider to the client). The environment is roughly divided into either the client
or the server providing consent to allow the middlebox in the connection. Conﬁgured
client side [40] consents to grant the middlebox access to traﬃc in an end-to-end
encrypted connection by allowing the middlebox to MITM the connection. A typical
example of such a model is Split TLS. The middlebox has access to all traﬃc and
is transparent to to the server. A variation to the ‘Conﬁgured client side model’ is
the ‘Dynamic client side model’ where the client learns the presence of the middlebox
after the clients attempts to contact the service in the respective network. In this
case, the client receives a certiﬁcate for the middlebox and the client can proceed
with the connection or not explicitly granting consent to the proxy. Contrary to the
client providing consent, there are models which allow the server to provide consent
in the similar manner. The client is transparent to the middlebox in this case. An
example of such an model is Keyless SSL [34]. We describe these models in the sub-
sequent sections. Recent proposals and models involve the client and the server to
negotiate and allow a predeﬁned list of middleboxes or allow for middlebox discovery.
15
Following the negotiation, the client and server grants read or write permissions to





In this chapter, we propose a benchmark to assess schemes which incorporate middle-
boxes in TLS connections. We follow up with a comparative evaluation of the schemes
using the benchmark and discuss how and why the properties are rated based on facts
or any assumptions made in the proposals.
The UDS framework was introduced in [31] and provides a semi-structured way
to comprehend the beneﬁts of a scheme. The properties chosen in the framework
allows the schemes to be [31] “rated across a common, broad spectrum of criteria
chosen objectively for relevance in wide ranging scenarios, without hidden agenda”.
The entities and context for trust in various schemes diﬀer widely in assumptions
made in their privacy model, user consent and deployability for operators. It is
important to understand the process and the end goal a scheme tries to achieve. By
introducing a benchmark that encompasses the properties of the schemes, we can
align the security goals with the deployment needs of operators and usability for end
users. The benchmark we propose addresses the assumptions made in the literature,
the trust between the entities, their requirements and what they accomplish.
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Schemes can be broadly classiﬁed into categories based on which end point would
provide consent to include the middlebox in the connection. Consent can be provided
by either the client or the server. In some schemes, it is assumed that the end user is
aware of the middlebox in the network by having an explicit list of the middleboxes
that they would allow to participate in the connection (the list in few cases is agreed
during handshake by the server and the client) while, with some schemes the end
users make policy decisions on discovery of a middlebox. The policy might apply to
each connection or for a longer period; granting speciﬁc permissions or complete read
and write permissions on the data.
Our classiﬁcation is based on which end point trusts the middlebox and the com-
munication strategy used between the end point and the middlebox. We categorize
schemes into two categories (scheme either provide client side consent or server side
consent to the middlebox) and the client side consent schemes are further classiﬁed
into three categories. These categories are:
1. Proxy based schemes: In this category, the middlebox acts as a proxy and termi-
nates the connection between the end points. The consent to add a middlebox
can be provided by the client or the server and the proxy pipes data between
the end points.
2. Passthrough: In this category, the middlebox allows the end points to com-
municate directly with each other. An endpoint then uses a custom protocol
to communicate with the middlebox and provide consent. The communication
protocol with the middlebox maybe inband or out-of-band with the connection
to the other end point.
3. Modiﬁed TLS: In this category, TLS is modiﬁed to do a three party key exchange
during the handshake. The end points agree on a predeﬁned list of middleboxes
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to use in the session or use an extension with the TLS ClientHello/ServerHello
for middlebox discovery. An end point can provide consent to the middlebox to
read/write components of the traﬃc after the initial negotiation.
3.1 UDS benchmark
The benchmarks are divided into three categories: Usability, Deployability and Se-
curity. For the rest of the paper, a property shall be addressed to with an italicized
mnemonic title.
The schemes are rated qualitatively as either supporting the property or not sup-
porting the property. In some scenarios, sometimes the property is not applicable and
is hence rated accordingly. Cases in which it is unclear if the property is supported
by the scheme or not, we make an assumption ﬁtting to the scheme or give it the
beneﬁt of the doubt and rate it to have a partial compliance for the property. Such
schemes generally lack suﬃcient technical details in their proposal. We discuss when
such an assumption is made for the scheme. The decision to evaluate the scheme
qualitatively rather than quantitatively (assigning a weight to each scheme and rank-
ing them linearly) is motivated by the fact that we would like to have a understanding
of the technical issues for using middleboxes in TLS and focus on solving those prob-
lems rather than ranking schemes linearly. The ratings illustrate only what a scheme
achieves. If a scheme supports a particular property, it does not mean that we endorse
the scheme to perform better than its alternatives. We now proceed to describe each
of the properties.
Usability
1. Middlebox discovery visibility : The client/user is aware of the existence of
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a middlebox when they make a connection to the server.
This property is not applicable for schemes that provide server side consent.
Rating for UDS framework:
Yes: The scheme shows the existence of a middlebox to the user/client during
each TLS connection.
Partial compliance: The scheme shows the existence of a middlebox is only
shown to the user/client initially when the middlebox is conﬁgured.
No: The scheme shows the existence of the middlebox is not shown to the
user/client during a TLS connection.
2. Middlebox persistence visibility : This property checks if the middlebox is
visible to the client/user when the user switches to a new network.
This property is not applicable for schemes that provide server side consent.
Rating for UDS framework:
Yes: The middlebox defaults to intercept each connection and show its exis-
tence to the user/client when the user switches to a new network.
No: The middlebox defaults to not intercept a connection when the user
switches to a new network.
3. Infrequent errors or open fails : The property puts in check if the scheme
is capable of handling open fails and supports error handling when the end
parties rely on alternative authentication methods (key pinning, DANE, HSTS
etc.) other than certiﬁcate validation.
Rating for UDS framework:
Yes: The scheme has a feature that allows the client to handle open fails. The
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client, middlebox and server should be capable of supporting HTTPS authen-
tication services other than certiﬁcate authentication.
No: The scheme has no feature to handle open fails.
Security
1. Server authentication : The client authenticates the server in the handshake
phase. Server authentication should be achieved before any TLS application
data is transmitted between the client and the server. The scheme should
always let the client authenticate the server’s certiﬁcate.
Rating for UDS framework:
Yes: The scheme allows the client to authenticate the server.
No: The client does not authenticate the server.
2. Middlebox recognition : Any middlebox that would intercept the connection
between a client and a server should be recognized by the client.
Rating for UDS framework:
Yes: The client recognizes the middlebox.
No: If the client does not recognize the middlebox.
3. Connection speciﬁc interception : The scheme allows ﬁne-grained data
conﬁdentiality for each connection between the end points and the middlebox
i.e. trusting a middlebox for one connection should not extend the trust to sub-
sequent and future connections. The end points can make several connections
and the middlebox (or a number of middleboxes in the network) may or may
not be able to perform functionality for all of these connections (based on the
policy set by the client/server).
Rating for UDS framework:
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Yes: The scheme has a mechanism to set ﬁne-grained access control on each
connection made by the end points.
No: The scheme has no mechanism to set ﬁne-grained access control on each
connection made by the end points.
4. Minimal read disclosure : The scheme supports least privilege for read ac-
cess on data in a connection which is intercepted by a middlebox. The middle-
box should be provided with the least read level access it requires to perform
its functionality. Read access can be classiﬁed into three levels: full read access,
partial read access and no read access. A scheme allows full read access if the
middlebox can read and inspect all data between the client and the server. A
scheme is marked as partial read access if a middlebox is allowed to read only
selective data sent between the client and the server, for example, in a partial
read access scheme, a middlebox would support keyword inspection giving the
middlebox privilege to read only few keywords. Other examples would include
schemes in which a middlebox has privileges set by the end points for the data
it can read. A scheme is marked no read access if the middlebox cannot read
the data communicated between the end points.
Rating for UDS framework:
Yes: The scheme provides no read access to the middlebox for the data trans-
mitted between the client and the server.
Partial compliance: The scheme provides partial read access to the middle-
box for the data transmitted between the client and the server.
No: The scheme provides full read access to the middlebox for the data trans-
mitted between the client and the server.
5. Minimal write access : A scheme should have minimal write access to the
data accessed by a middlebox. A middlebox should be provided with write
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access to the data only if required. The scheme at any given phase should
be able to maintain message integrity between the end points. The client and
server should be able to detect modiﬁcation made to the traﬃc between them.
Write access can be classiﬁed into three levels: full write access, partial write
access and no write access. Full write access implies that the middlebox can
modify data before it pipes it between the client and the server. Partial write
access means the scheme supports selective modiﬁcation to data that is sent
between the client and the server. No write access means the middlebox does
not have access to the data communicated between the client and the server.
Rating for UDS framework:
Yes: The scheme provides no write access to the middlebox for the data trans-
mitted between the client and the server.
No: The scheme provides full write access to the middlebox for the data trans-
mitted between the client and the server.
Partial compliance: The scheme provides partial write access to the middle-
box for the data transmitted between the client and the server.
6. Client negotiation for TLS : This property puts in check if the client is
allowed to handle TLS handshake negotiations with the server.
Rating for UDS framework:
Yes: The scheme allows the client to negotiate all handshake parameters for a
middlebox in the connection.
No: The scheme does not allow the client to negotiate all handshake parameters
for a middlebox in the connection.
This property is not applicable for schemes that provide server side consent.
Deployability
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1. No signiﬁcant latency : The property checks if the scheme has additional
overhead than a regular TLS connection. Overhead can be measured in term of
extra round trips, page load times, handshake sizes (and ﬁle download times for
varying conﬁgurations of link speed and ﬁle size). In our evaluation, we com-
pare the number of additional TLS handshakes between the entities in a scheme
with the entities (client and server) in a regular end-to-end TLS connection. A
TLS handshake in the scheme maybe extended (requiring additional informa-
tion to be carried between the entities or be dependent on some process). For
this property, an extended handshake is the same as a regular end-to-end TLS
handshake and we ignore the additional network latency of the extended TLS
handshake.
Rating for UDS framework:
Yes: A scheme is rated yes if it has equal number of TLS handshakes than that
of a regular end-to-end TLS connection.
No: A scheme is rated no if it has more number of TLS handshakes than that
of a regular end-to-end TLS connection.
2. Server compatibility : This property keeps in check if in a scheme any changes
are made at the server end or additional extensions are needed to the TLS
protocol itself. An user (organization/enterprise) at the server end would less
likely adopt another scheme if additional modiﬁcations are required at their
end.
Rating for UDS framework:
Yes: The scheme requires no changes to be made at the server end.
No: The scheme requires changes to be made at the server end.
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3. Middlebox compatibility : This property checks if the scheme requires mid-
dlebox providers to make changes at the middlebox end. The scheme would be
easier to use if it supports extensions/plugins to middleboxes and can be de-
ployed with existing infrastructure. If a non mature scheme were to be adopted,
in-network processing would require middlebox providers to update their soft-
ware/hardware.
Rating for UDS framework:
Yes: If no changes are required at the middlebox end.
No: If changes need to be made to the middlebox for it to be usable in the
scheme.
3.2 Summary of schemes evaluated using UDS frame-
work
We use the benchmark described in the previous section to do a qualitative evaluation
of TLS middlebox interception schemes. The evaluation process is summarized in
Table 1. In this section, we summarize the diﬀerent schemes according to the category
they belong to. We start with schemes that are based on giving client side consent
to the middlebox.
3.2.1 Modiﬁed TLS schemes
1. mcTLS: mcTLS [59] proposes to let the client and the server agree on a mid-
dlebox/list of middleboxes that should be authorized in the connection to read
or write certain parts of the traﬃc. They introduce the notion of contexts. An
context is a set of symmetric encryption and/or message authentication code
(MAC) keys for controlling who can read and write the data. In other words,
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the context is a set of privileges and these privileges allow the data to be read
or modiﬁed by the middlebox. Applications can associate each context with a
purpose and access permissions for each middlebox. For instance, web browser-
s/servers could use one context for HTTP headers and another for content. The
client and the server decide for each context its privileges and accordingly the
middlebox gets access to keys and can read (encrypt/decrypt) or write (en-
crypt/decrypt and authenticate) over the context. They introduce a three way
key-exchange protocol for their scheme by extending the TLS handshake to es-
tablish ephemeral session keys for each party taking part in the protocol. The
paper discusses the security model for middleboxes in a TLS session, the rele-
vant permissions required by a middlebox in a TLS session and the impact of
using contexts on privacy of the TLS session in mcTLS.
2. Blindbox: The Blindbox [73] proposal introduces the usage of two party com-
putation to implement secure keyword inspection by middleboxes in an end-
to-end TLS connection. The key diﬀerence between mcTLS and Blindbox is
that in Blindbox, the middlebox can read only keywords (generated by a third
party called as rule generator) in the traﬃc. The middlebox cannot modify the
traﬃc. The scheme use diﬀerent cryptographic protocols to achieve their goals
altogether.
Keyword inspection allows the middlebox to detect whether the encrypted
traﬃc between the client and the server matches a particular pattern or keyword.
In the proposal, two streams of TLS connections are set up. The ﬁrst stream
allows the client to communicate with the server directly. For the second stream,
all data sent by the client is divided into a number of tokens. These tokens are
encrypted by the client and sent to the middlebox. An entity: ‘Rule generator’
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(trusted by the endpoints), generates a list of keywords (or rules) for which it
wants the middlebox to inspect the encrypted traﬃc. Using oblivious transfer
and two party computation, the middlebox is permitted to inspect the traﬃc for
particular keywords without it gaining access to the plain text. The middlebox
can only inspect the traﬃc for particular keywords that match the attack rules
established by the rule generator. The rules/keywords are oblivious to the
endpoints.
3. EFGH (End-to-End Fine Grained HTTP): EFGH [41] is a scheme that
extends the TLS protocol to allows middleboxes to be introduced in a TLS
connection between a client and a server. EFGH and mcTLS achieve the same
end goals. The key diﬀerence between mcTLS and EFGH lies in the approach
taken for endpoints to make selective content visible to the middlebox. mcTLS
uses the notion of contexts while EFGH uses a custom header in the packet
frame.
EFGH introduce a three party key exchange protocol, which upon completion
produces four types of encryption keys; two of them are used to encrypt data
of which one key is shared between the client, proxy and the server and the
other key is shared between the client and the server only. The remaining two
keys are authentication keys used to authenticate data between the proxy and
the server and the proxy and the client. The authors of EFGH modify the TLS
framing format by adding a TLS record header to have a custom frame (also
referenced as an EFGH frame). The EFGH frame has a header carrying extra
information on the type of the frame. Frames are typically divided into three
types: handshake, application data and alerts. Application data frames further
contain a header, metadata block and data block. The header in the application
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data frame indicates whether the frame’s data is visible to the middlebox or not.
An EFGH protocol also includes a policy which typically encodes ﬁne-grained
disclosure rules. The rules in the policy informs the principals about who (an
entity in the TLS session) is allowed to see what (protocol elements).
3.2.2 Passthrough
1. Ubicrypt: The Ubicrypt [81] scheme allows end-to-end encryption between a
client and a server while allowing a trusted gateway to inspect traﬃc. Ubicrypt
does not need modiﬁcations on the server end. Ubicrypt works on the QUIC
protocol (QUIC is an application layer protocol that sits on top of UDP and
utilizes a cryptographic protocol similar to TLS for authentication and encryp-
tion). At the start of the protocol, the trusted gateway allows an Ubicrypt
client to send session negotiation packets to the server until the session encryp-
tion keys are generated. The Ubicrypt client securely leaks the QUIC session
keys for an connection to the gateway in a separate secure channel. The gateway
continues to buﬀer packets sent by the client or the server and on receipt of the
keys will allow the packets to pass through. The scheme however suﬀers from
poor real word performance and was not evaluated over realistic data points.
Further, they do not have a proof of concept that performs decryption of the
packets or a evaluation of the resources and time required to do so.
Our scheme Triraksha in concept is similar to Ubicrypt however, we incor-
porate middleboxes for TLS instead of QUIC and enable decryption of TLS
packets. Further, we talk in detail about sharing only TLS encryption keys to
provide ﬁne-grained trust in our model.
2. Sharing record protocol keys with a middlebox in TLS (SRPK): SRPK
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[61] uses session key proliferation to achieve its goals of sharing symmetric ses-
sion keys between a TLS client and a middlebox. The key diﬀerence between
SRPK and Ubicrypt is that SRPK is server incompatible. SRPK uses a separate
content type “KeyshareInfo” added with the ClientHello for middlebox discov-
ery and negotiation. On agreement with the server (for including a middlebox),
it sends the symmetric keys. Ubicrypt simply resorts to using a trusted gate-
way. Further Ubicrypt supports only the QUIC protocol and SRPK supports
only TLS.
Speciﬁcally, the authors of SRPK construct a ‘tls keyshare extension’ that is
included in the TLS ClientHello and TLS ServerHello. The extension contains
a sequence of SHA-256 hashes of middlebox certiﬁcates. The client sends the
hashes of the certiﬁcates of middleboxes that it wants to include in the session
and the server sends a subset of the same hashes for those which it agrees to
trust. The RFC deﬁnes a new record type ‘KeyshareInfo’. This record type
allows the client, proxy and the server to agree upon the ciphersuites and TLS
version and also contains a data structure to store cryptographic keys. On
completion of the protocol, a trusted middlebox will receive the encryption/de-
cryption keys in ‘KeyshareInfo’ for the data transmitted between the client
and the server. They discuss how the client, middlebox and proxy process the
‘KeyshareInfo’ record at their end.
3.2.3 Proxy based schemes
1. Split TLS and Split TLS as CA: We discussed Split TLS in Section 2.2.3.
Here we discuss a subtle variation to Split TLS in which the middlebox has
as a certiﬁcate from a certiﬁcate authority or is a certiﬁcate authority. Unlike
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regular Split TLS where the middlebox simply provides its certiﬁcate to the
client, here, the middlebox intercepts the connection with a certiﬁcate signed
by a certiﬁcate authority that the client trusts. The middlebox does not have
to present the client with its certiﬁcate and can intercept the connection by
simply being an intermediate in the network.
2. Explicit Proxies for HTTP/2.0 (Exproxy), R. Peon et al.: The Exproxy
RFC [64] proposed the use of explicit proxies. Their proposal falls under two
threat models. In the ﬁrst threat model, they use a trusted proxy, which is
capable of inspecting all data sent and received by the end points while in the
second model they use a caching proxy in which only data that can be served
from the cache is inspected by the proxy. The middlebox (proxy) intercepts
the connection in both Split TLS and Exproxy but the key diﬀerence is that
Split TLS makes use of certiﬁcates to get the client private key while Exproxy
explicitly provides the “decryption material” to the middlebox.
In Exproxy, the client will decide whether it should use a null cipher for
encryption of data or give the decryption key for the session to the proxy de-
pending on the security mode. In case of a trusted proxy, the client can use a
null cipher for the TLS stream or give the decryption keys for the encrypted
data to the proxy while during the use of a caching proxy, the client should not
use a null cipher for the TLS stream and not provide the decryption keys for
the encrypted data to the proxy.
3. TLS proxy server extension, Mcgrew et al. (TPS): The proposal allows
proxies to be MITM entities. The key diﬀerence between Split TLS and TPS is
that TPS is server incompatible and TPS makes use of a custom extension in
the TLS handshake to introduce the middlebox in the connection. The custom
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extension is also used for giving consent to the middlebox to participate in the
connection.
The principal contribution in TPS [55] is to construct a ‘ProxyInfoExtension’.
According to the scheme, when a client attempts to contact a server, the TLS
proxy intercepts and checks if the TLS ClientHello has a ProxyInfoExtension.
It then holds the stream data sent by the client. The proxy will then continue to
complete a TLS session with the server and send to the client, assertion about
the server and the session. The ProxyInfoExtension carries this assertion. The
client then performs authentication and authorization processes (checking server
certiﬁcate, hostname etc.) for the server certiﬁcates. The client also authen-
ticates the proxy and establishes trust. On successful run of the protocol, the
proxy will be able to relay data between the client and its peer connection. The
RFC addresses multiple goals such as handling middlebox discovery, authenti-
cation of server and proxy by the client and allowing the client to make access
control decisions for the proxy over the content it transmits.
4. Explicit Trusted Proxy in HTTP/2.0, Loreto et al (ETP): The RFC
[53] describes how an user can provide consent for a trusted Proxy to be securely
involved in the connection when the user is requesting an HTTP URI resource
over HTTP2 with TLS. Conceptually, there is little diﬀerence with ETP and
Split TLS. The key diﬀerence lies that ETP requires user consent to include the
middlebox for each connection.
In the scheme, when the user has given consent to the presence of the proxy,
the client switches to a “proxy mode” in which it does not check the hostname of
the origin server against the server’s identity as presented in the server certiﬁcate
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message. The scheme also allows an user to “opt out” and choose to bypass
the proxy. Proxy discovery is described in two methods. In the ﬁrst method,
discovery of the proxy is done when the client receives the server certiﬁcate
(the server certiﬁcate contains an ‘Extended KeyUsage’ extension and a ‘proxy
authentication key purpose ID’). It performs certiﬁcate validation checks and
secures consent from the user to allow the proxy in the TLS connection. In the
second method, the proxy indicates its presence and identity by intercepting
a TLS ClientHello message, and forcing the client to redirect to a secure page
on a portal where the user requests to consent to the presence of the secure
proxy. In both the methods once the trusted proxy has been identiﬁed and user
consent is established, the proxy is trusted and has access to all data. Loreto et
al. further constrain the trusted proxy such that URIs that are available over
the HTTPS scheme do not traverse the proxy. This has the eﬀect of precluding
the proxy from performing services that may be of beneﬁt to the user
3.2.4 Schemes that provide server side consent
We ﬁrst summarize two schemes (conﬁgured server side) and then some Industry
patents which provide an abstract description on how they use middleboxes in a TLS
connection. In this thesis, we do not focus on schemes that use server side consent
for middleboxes in detail and do not evaluate them with the UDS benchmark.
1. Keyless SSL: Keyless SSL [34] was introduced by CloudFlare and allows for it
to have read and write access to traﬃc between the client and the server. Keyless
SSL pushes the consent for access to data to the server side. Keyless SSL lets
regular servers retain custody of their private keys while they use CloudFlare
to serve traﬃc. In Keyless SSL, the private key of the server is moved to a
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‘keyserver’. During a TLS handshake, when the client sends a random pre-
master secret encrypted by the server’s public key. CloudFlare will forward
the encrypted pre-master secret to the keyserver and the keyserver returns an
unencrypted pre-master secret (as the keyserver has the private key to decrypt
the encrypted random password). Once it receives the random pre-master secret
for the TLS session, CloudFlare and the client can derive identical TLS session
keys and CloudFlare can serve server traﬃc encrypted by the TLS session key.
The connection between CloudFlare and the keyserver is encrypted by a strong
cipher suite.
2. SSL spliting: SSL spliting [51] proposed to simulate a SSL connection with
a client by combining authentication records from the server with data records
from the proxy. The scheme reduces bandwidth load on servers by allowing
proxies to serve data which is endorsed by the server. The server signs the
data while the proxy is a distribution channel which serves data to the client.
SSL splitting does not provide conﬁdentiality, as the proxy has access to the
encryption keys shared between the server and the client and uses them to re-
encrypt the merged stream. The proposal is hence limited to serving only public
data. During the setup phase, the client attempts to initiate an handshake with
the server. The proxy will replay the handshake messages to the server and in
return the server is authenticated to the client. To respond to the data resource
requested by a client, the server sends the MAC of the resource along with a
short unique identiﬁer. The proxy splices the payload sent by the server, it uses
the unique identiﬁer to lookup the resource in its cache and then merges the
MAC from the spliced payload with the resource. It replays the reconstructed
stream to the client in a manner indistinguishable to an original stream that
would be sent by the server. The server does not have to send any data records
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and the proxy has access to the encryption keys but not to the authentication
keys. If a proxy does not have a particular resource in its cache then it triggers
a cache miss handler which is simple HTTP like protocol that downloads the
resource from the server.
3. Terminating SSL connections without locally-accessible private keys,
Akami Technologies: The patent [42] ﬁled by Akami technologies is very
similar to Cloudﬂare’s Keyless SSL. The protocol dictates the SSL handshake
and decryption of the pre master secret for the server to be done at a remote
location. The server in context with the patent is an edge server in a CDN
and not the principal server of the website. The proxy is split to function in a
client-server model with the client side residing at the SSL termination point
(the edge server). The server component of the proxy resides in a remote place
and is associated as a data store in which decryption keys (private keys) are
stored. The decryption keys for a server certiﬁcate do not reside at the end
point (the edge server) and are never accessible from the server component of
the proxy. During a SSL handshake, the client proxy component proxies the
encrypted pre-master secret it receives from a conventional SSL client and the
server component of the proxy returns the decrypted pre master secret. The
client component of the proxy forwards this to the edge server with which it can
derive master keys and continue with the rest of the handshake normally. The
connection between the client proxy component and the server proxy component
is mutually authenticated.
4. Proxy SSL handoﬀ via mid-stream re-negotiation, F5 Networks: The
patent [30] ﬁled by F5 Networks provide an infrastructure in which a single
existing SSL connection can be used to serve content from more than one server
device. A traﬃc management device (TMD) is setup between a client and the
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ﬁrst server. To switch to another server the process is as follows: for an existing
SSL connection between a client and a server device, the TMD may request a
client to re-negotiate an encrypted connection. The criterion for which a re-
negotiation request is initiated by a TMD is server conﬁgured, for example it
maybe a schedule maintenance of a server or based on the type of data requested
by a client. The TMD receives the private key from the ﬁrst server and can
decrypt all data sent by the client. The TMD can redirect the responses of
the re-negotiation request to a second server device based on network topology,
network traﬃc, server capacity etc. The TMD receives the private key from
the second server device, decrypts the responses from the client and may itself
becomes the endpoint by encrypting the messages or may forward the responses
to the second server device enabling it to be the endpoint.
5. Accessing SSL connection data by a third-party, F5 Networks: The
patent [66] discusses a method for a proxy intercepting SSL connections which
is situated between a client and a server or a client and a traﬃc management
device (TMD). It speciﬁes various embodiments for the connection setup. The
secret data to decrypt content in a SSL session can concurrently be given to the
proxy or can be given in a separate out-of-band connection. The secret data
can be encrypted by the sender and may consist of the pre master secret and
server/client random or the master secret. The proxy has access to the payload
sent by either end point and can decrypt the data and modify it. The payload
may be scanned, logged, audited and even used to make a traﬃc management
decision. The proxy can also decide to terminate the SSL connection or act
as an end point. For an SSL rehandshake request, the proxy checks the SSL
session ID for the party it received the Hello request from. If the SSL session
ID points to a previous session, then session keys for the proxy interception are
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derived from the same secret data logged by the proxy.
6. Strong SSL proxy authentication with forced SSL re-negotiation, F5
Networks: The patent [28] reciprocates an idea based on the same design of
Split TLS. In the setup, the client initiates an encrypted network connection
with a proxy. Having established a secure connection with the proxy, it forward
the target server domain name or IP address it wants to connect to. The proxy
responds to the client with an encrypted session re-negotiation message. The
client sends to the proxy an encrypted session handshake message. The proxy
device forwards the encrypted session handshake message to the target server,
and continues to pipe handshake messages between the client and the server
device, enabling the client device and the target server device to establish an
encrypted session.
7. Authentication delegation based on re-veriﬁcation of cryptographic
evidence, Microsoft: The patent [57] discusses on authentication delegation
by re-verifying the cryptographic evidence. The client authenticates to the
proxy (gateway) using a TLS handshake with client authentication. A record-
ing of the TLS handshake (THR) is provided either to the web server (which
re-veriﬁes the validity of the handshake) or to a third party entity (which upon
verifying the recording, provides user credentials to the gateway which is further
authenticated with the web server). The web server or third party verify that
the user has authenticated to the gateway (by validating the certiﬁcate verify
message in the THR). If the user credentials (e.g., client certiﬁcate) are authen-
ticated by the web server, access to the requested web server is granted to the
client/user, and if the client certiﬁcate cannot be veriﬁed, access is denied. The
scheme is limited to function only when there is client side authentication in
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TLS and the client and gateway do not resume a previous TLS session/dupli-
cate an existing session. Replay attacks to reuse the recorded TLS handshake
record are prevented by using timestamps in handshake messages or embedding
of a nonce (provided by the web server) by the proxy.
3.3 Sample evaluation based on the UDS bench-
mark
In this section, we discuss some of the speciﬁc cases and give an example for how
some of the properties are rated.
1. Middlebox discovery visibility : An example of a scheme that is ‘Yes’ rated
is TPS. The TPS RFC relies on a TLS extension which is used by the proxy
to provide information to the client or server about its presence. They leave it
to the client applications to visualize the existence of a proxy to the user. An
example of a scheme that is rated as ‘No’ is Split TLS as a certiﬁcate authority.
In this case, the middlebox acts as a CA. It can present a certiﬁcate (signed by
a legitimate root certiﬁcate) to the client/user. The client/user would not be
aware that the connection is intercepted. An example of a scheme that is rated
as partially compliant is regular Split TLS. In this case, an user/client accepts a
certiﬁcate for the middlebox during conﬁguration. The user/client may or may
not be aware if the connection is intercepted. All schemes that use a predeﬁned
list of middleboxes to include in an encrypted connection or need a predeﬁned
conﬁguration to connect to the middlebox are rated as partially compliant.
2. Infrequent errors or open fails: An example of a scheme that is rated
‘No’ is Split TLS as in Split TLS, authentication mechanisms like key pinning
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are not supported. An example of a scheme that is rated ‘Yes’ is TPS as they
support other authentication mechanism like DANE, HSTS etc. A scheme that
makes modiﬁcations by extending TLS does not support Infrequent errors or
open fails as it is unclear how open fails are handled by the client and the
server. A scheme in this case is rated ‘No’ unless they discuss speciﬁcally if
they support existing alternative authentication mechanisms for TLS.
3. No signiﬁcant latency : The number of handshakes in Split TLS for a sin-
gle TLS connection are two (one each between a client and a middlebox and
a middlebox and a server) and hence does not support No signiﬁcant latency.
Schemes are broadly categorized as to use upto three handshakes in their proto-
col. On a general note, three handshakes mean that there is one TLS handshake
between the client and the server, one TLS handshake between the client and
the middlebox and then one TLS handshake between the middlebox and the
server. Schemes that use two TLS handshakes mean that generally there is
one TLS handshake between the server and the middlebox and one between
the middlebox and the client. Schemes that have one TLS handshake gener-
ally have some kind of an additional extension that is included along with the
TLS Sever/ClientHello. This extension would carry information to include and
authenticate a middlebox in the session. The entire TLS session is negotiated
in two RTTs (round trip times; the same number of RTTs in a regular TLS
connection with no middlebox).
4. Minimal read/write disclosure: A scheme is rated as partially compliant
when the end points can control what components of the traﬃc can be read/-
modiﬁed by the middlebox. An example of such a scheme is mcTLS.
5. Server compatibility : The schemes do not support server compatibility when
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modiﬁcations are made to the standard HTTPS/HTTP protocols or involve the
server to be modiﬁed for the middlebox to intercept the connection. An example
of a scheme that is rated as ‘No’ is mcTLS.
3.4 Evaluation of schemes (client consent) based
on the UDS benchmark
In this section, we evaluate all schemes that provide client side consent to the mid-
dlebox (grouped under their category). We choose and discuss the rating for one
representative scheme in detail for each category. For the rest of the schemes in the
category, we only discuss the diﬀerences in the rating process relative to the repre-
sentative scheme.
3.4.1 Modiﬁed TLS
1. mcTLS:mcTLS complies partially withMiddlebox discovery visibility as it uses
a predeﬁned list for middleboxes that the client and the server want to include
in the connection. The scheme does not support Middlebox persistence visibility
because for each connection, the client sends a list of middleboxes (included in
the ClientHello) that it want to include in the connection. If an user switches
a network, the client would still continue to ask the server to include the list
of middleboxes in the connection. mcTLS fails to discuss how it would han-
dle open fails or other authentication mechanisms and thus does not comply
with Infrequent errors or open fails. mcTLS requires the server and middlebox
to support the scheme and hence does not support Server compatibility and
Middlebox compatibility. mcTLS achieves the entire TLS negotiation in one ex-
tended TLS handshake (here extended TLS handshake is based on the three
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way key exchange protocol. It is a regular TLS handshake with symmetric key
establishment for middlebox) and hence supports No signiﬁcant latency. As
described in the three way handshake of mcTLS, it is clear that the scheme
supports Server authentication and Middlebox recognition and TLS protocol ne-
gotiation. An application and server using mcTLS can set contexts in two ways:
context per data stream or as a middlebox policy. A middlebox can read/write
data only if the it has the respective context key. Hence, we rate mcTLS as to
partially supportMinimal read disclosure andMinimal write access and support
for Connection speciﬁc interception.
2. EFGH: mcTLS and EFGH are rated similarly as they both achieve the same
properties using a subtly diﬀerent approach. EFGH handles middlebox discov-
ery and discusses very brieﬂy that the client ﬁrst establishes a TCP connection
with the middlebox by a proxy auto-conﬁg ﬁle, DHCP, or manually conﬁguring
the address of a proxy in browser. An user can switch conﬁguration on how he
connects to the proxy by changing his browser settings, DHCP conﬁguration
etc. when he switches his network and is hence rated to support Middlebox per-
sistence visibility. All other properties are rated the same as mcTLS for similar
reasons.
3. Blindbox: mcTLS and Blindbox are rated similarly. Blindbox does supports
Minimal write access as the middlebox cannot modify traﬃc between the client
and the server. The scheme requires three separate streams: one regular TLS
connection, one to transmit the “searchable” encrypted tokens, and one to listen
if a middlebox on path requests garbled circuits. Only one TLS handshake
is used between the sender and a receiver in the scheme. The performance
overhead of Blindbox on a connection is due to obfuscated rule encryption and
only one TLS handshake is used between the end points. We rate is as to support
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No signiﬁcant latency. All other properties are rated the same as mcTLS for
similar reasons.
3.4.2 Passthrough
1. Ubicrypt: The scheme does not discuss how an user would be aware of the
middlebox inspecting the packet payload. The trusted gateway (middlebox)
in Ubicrypt is preconﬁgured to be a network hop in the connection and hence
partially complies with Middlebox discovery visibility. The gateway is no longer
part of the network and the client defaults to using a regular end-to-end TLS
connection with the server when the user switches a network. It hence supports
Middlebox persistence visibility. Ubicrypt would rely on existing browser alter-
native authentication mechanisms and hence supports Infrequent errors or open
fails. Even though the real world performance for their proof of concept was
poor, the protocol establishes a QUIC connection in one extended TLS hand-
shake (extended TLS handshake here means the regular TLS handshake along
with the connections that leaks the QUIC sessions keys) and hence supports No
signiﬁcant latency. Ubicrypt is deployable and supports Server compatibility as
no server side modiﬁcations are required, however, does not have support for
Middlebox compatibility. Ubicrypt supports Server authentication and Middle-
box recognition as the scheme allows the client to authenticate the server using
QUIC and the threat model only allows a trusted gateway as a middlebox.
The scheme is modeled such that clients simply failing to leak the keys would
have the network connections terminated before it sends QUIC application data
packets to the server. The keys have to be leaked for each connection or the
client does not communicate with the server. We rate it to support Connection
speciﬁc interception. It is unclear if the MAC keys are also leaked along with
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the encryption keys in Ubicrypt. We assume that for the gateway to correctly
decrypt and verify integrity for the data, the MAC keys are leaked. Following
this assumption, Ubicrypt does not provide for Minimal read disclosure and
Minimal write access. Ubicrypt supports Client negotiations for TLS as the
client communicates with the server directly.
2. Triraksha: The rating for Triraksha is described in Section 4.4.1.
3. SRPK: SRPK supports Middlebox discovery visibility as the client sends a list
of middleboxes that are in connection to the server and allows for a unknown
middlebox to be added to the connection as well. SRPK supports Middlebox
persistence visibility as the client sends the hashes of the certiﬁcates of middle-
boxes that it knows are on-path to the server. If an user switches a network,
the new connection to the server would include only the new list of middleboxes
in the network. SRPK does not support Server compatibility as a new content
type ‘KeyshareInfo’ is used in the TLS connection. SRPK does not support
Minimal read access and Minimal write access as the client shares the RSA
encrypted record of the write keys (for both client and server) with the middle-
box. SRPK allows the client to have access controls for the proxy over a speciﬁc
domain and hence supports Connection speciﬁc interception. SRPK establishes
the connection in one TLS handshake and hence supports No signiﬁcant latency.
3.4.3 Proxy
1. Split TLS: With Split TLS, the middlebox certiﬁcate is installed by the client
upon ﬁrst connection. This is a case of preconﬁgured middlebox and is hence
rated as to partially support Middlebox discovery visibility. Once a certiﬁcate
from the client is installed on the root certiﬁcate directory, the client/user is
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always conﬁgured to allow the proxy in the connection. It does not support
Middlebox persistence visibility. With Split TLS, authentication mechanisms
like HSTS and key pinning are not allowed. It does not support Infrequent errors
or open fails. No modiﬁcations are needed at the middlebox and server end and
hence supports Server compatibility andMiddlebox compatibility. Split TLS uses
two handshakes (one between the client and the middlebox and one between the
server and the middlebox) and hence does not support No signiﬁcant latency.
With Split TLS, the server is not authenticated by the client and the client does
not negotiate the TLS handshake. It is hence not Server authentication and
Client negotiation for TLS. The client can see the certiﬁcate of the Middlebox
and is hence Middlebox recognition. Split TLS does not allow for Connection
speciﬁc interception. Once a certiﬁcate is installed on the client, the middlebox
is capable of modifying and reading all encrypted traﬃc in the connection. It
hence does not support Minimal read disclosure and Minimal write access.
2. Split TLS as a CA: Regular Split TLS and Split TLS as CA are rated sim-
ilarly. However, the diﬀerence lies in Middlebox discovery visibility. The client
trusts the middlebox as the middlebox certiﬁcate is signed by the same root
CA as that of a root certiﬁcate on the client computer. It is hence does not
support Middlebox discovery visibility. The scheme does not support Middlebox
recognition as the middlebox presents its certiﬁcate to the client signed by a
CA that the client trusts. The rest of the properties are rated the same as Split
TLS for similar reasons.
3. Exproxy: Split TLS and Exproxy are rated quite similarly. With Exproxy the
client is preconﬁgured to connect to the proxy and is hence partially compliant
withMiddlebox discovery visibility. In Exproxy, an user can switch conﬁguration
on how he connects to the proxy by changing his proxy connection settings and
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is hence Middlebox persistence visibility. Exproxy is not Server compatibility
and Middlebox compatibility as it requires modiﬁcations at the middlebox and
the server end. The trusted proxy model does not support Minimal read access
as it has access to all the traﬃc in the connection while the threat model of using
a caching proxy partially supports Minimal read access and supports Minimal
write access. The caching proxy is authenticated and it is not provided with
the decryption keys to the encrypted traﬃc. However, the caching proxy can
still serve the client with cached data and hence is rated partially compliant.
The rest of the properties are rated the same as Split TLS for similar reasons.
4. TPS: TPS supports Middlebox discovery visibility as a TLS extension is used
by the proxy to provide information to the client or server about it. It sup-
ports Middlebox persistence visibility as the custom extension would be used
to involve a middlebox for each connection irregardless of the network. TPS
supports Infrequent errors or open fails as they speciﬁcally mention that the
scheme can support alternative authentication mechanisms. TPS does not sup-
port No signiﬁcant latency as it uses two TLS handshakes to make a connection.
TPS is not Server compatibility and Middlebox compatibility as it requires the
server and middlebox to support the ‘ProxyInfo’ extension. TPS does Server
authentication, Middlebox recognition and Client negotiation for TLS in their
scheme. These three properties are supported by the use of the ‘ProxyInfo’
extension. The extension is send with each connection and hence TPS is Con-
nection speciﬁc interception. Once the proxy is part of the connection, it has
access to all the traﬃc in the connection and is capable of modifying it. It does
not support Minimal read disclosure and Minimal write access.
5. ETP: ETP is rated similar to Split TLS for most of the properties for similar
reasons. ETP supports Connection speciﬁc interception, Middlebox discovery
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visibility and Middlebox persistence visibility as it involves the user/client con-

















































































































































































Split TLS            
Spit TLS as CA            
ETP            
TPS            
Trusted Exproxy            








h SRPK            
Ubicrypt            









mcTLS            
Blindbox            
EFGH            
Table 1: Summary of the evaluation of client side consenting schemes with the UDS
benchmark. Legend:  the scheme supports the property;  the scheme does not
support the property; and  the scheme partially complies with the property
3.5 Related work omitted from UDS framework
In this section, we discuss some of the related literature that is not included with the
evaluation in the UDS framework. These proposals are not included with the UDS
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framework as they either lack suﬃcient technical details or are only partially related
to our work.
Stebila et al. [75] examines the security and performance of CloudFlare’s Keyless
SSL, in which the principal web server retains possession of their private key and
splits the TLS state machine geographically with the edge server and a key server.
Keyless SSL allows to use a private key proxy service and hence, decreases the trust
given to an edge server while still being able to do data caching and compression.
They ﬁnd the latency to be sightly higher but better than the principal web server
serving content directly to the edge server.
RFC 3280 [78] speciﬁes the Internet standard for proxy certiﬁcates based on the
X.509 public key infrastructure. The document deﬁnes properties for proxy certiﬁ-
cates as a means of providing restricted proxying within an (extended) X.509 PKI
based authentication system.
Any node refusal [1] includes proxies in TLS sessions by requiring trusted proxies
to have their own end-to-end HTTPS session with the browser when processing traﬃc
from an HTTPS content server. The proxy establishes an end-to-end intra-connection
using TLS with a NULL cipher (A cipher with no encryption but still does data
authentication and data integrity checking) between the browser and the server. The
traﬃc sent from the client to the server is encrypted by the end-to-end TLS sessions,
while being viewable by the proxy. The browser and web server can authenticate and
validate the integrity of the data. Any node (client/server) can refuse participation of
sending data on a per object basis. The scheme is not included in the UDS framework
due to lack of technical detail in the paper.
Several patents [29], [46], [57], [35] and [54] discuss methods like optimizing SSL
handshakes, support for delegation of SSL handshakes to secondary server devices,
form based login authentication in SSL through a proxy and insertion of resources by
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a proxy in Split SSL. Most of these ideas are represented and similar to some of the
patents in the previous section and hence we do not discuss them.
Liang et al. in their paper [52] study the current practices of using HTTPS with
CDNs. They investigated 20 popular CDN providers and 10,721 of their customer web
sites. They observed that 15 percent of them raised alerts of invalid certiﬁcates, reify-
ing the broken trust model of HTTPS with CDNs. They also provide a lightweight
and ﬂexible DANE based solution that addresses the HTTPS authentication problem
in the CDN environment. In the solution, the client issues a DNS query request to
view the web server’s TLSA records and can recognize the delegation relationship
between entities.
Jawi et al. [45] use a non intrusive, forward proxy with adaptive security features
for SSL/TLS connections. The proxy has three components for monitoring, analysis
and response for each connection. A security policy is used with the analysis com-
ponent which feeds information of each SSL/TLS connection for static and dynamic
testing before proceeding to the response component. The security policy contains
static attributes (cipher suites, root certiﬁcates, key exchanges, ciphers and hashes)
and dynamic attributes (SSL certiﬁcates speciﬁc to a connection). The JSON schema
is used to deﬁne the attributes and policies used for testing. Scripts are then run to
match the attributes with the policies and if the attributes default to the policy then
an error is raised in the response component.
RFC 2660 [65] deﬁnes Secure HTTP (S-HTTP) which provides secure communi-
cation mechanisms between an HTTP client-server duo. They aim to improve the
status-quo for commercial transactions in a wide range of applications. S-HTTP
does not require client side public key certiﬁcates and supports only symmetric key
operation modes. S-HTTP deﬁnes two mechanisms for key transfer, the ﬁrst uses
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“public-key enveloped key” exchange and the second method uses “externally ar-
ranged keys”. For the latter method, the data is encrypted by using a prearranged
session key, with key identiﬁcation information speciﬁed in the header lines. The
S-HTTP protocol also speciﬁes interaction between a client and a proxy in their pro-
tocol. The client and a proxy negotiate cryptographic options that the proxy sent.
On agreement, a client will recursively encapsulate the data and send it to the proxy.
When the proxy receives a message, it will strip the outer encapsulation to recover
the message and pipe it forward to the server.
Backes et al present WebTrust [26], an integrity and authenticity framework for
HTTP that “allows on the ﬂy veriﬁcation of static, dynamic and real time web
stream content from untrusted servers”. It uses iframes for veriﬁability of content
provided from diﬀerent web servers. Under their model, WebTrust provides protec-
tion of HTTP content against active network attackers. WebTrust enables the client
to detect any modiﬁed data packet upon arrival without downloading the entire docu-
ment. Webtrust also enables the use of web cache (proxies) but looses conﬁdentiality
of content in this case.
Some proposals work to incorporate middleboxes by working on a diﬀerent layer
in the OSI stack. IPsec [71] proposes to encrypt and authenticate data at the IP
layer. There are signiﬁcant limitations to use IPsec with middleboxes. The overhead
of double encryption when TLS is used with IPsec and the lack of separate key
management scheme make the adoption less likely. TCPcrypt [18] establishes end-
to-end encrypted sessions at the TCP layer. TCPcrypt has reduced overhead on
the server and leaves authentication to the application. However, TCPcrypt does
not replace TLS and suﬀers from drawbacks like: using short lived keys to provide
forward secrecy and the lack of a key conﬁrmation in its 4 way handshake. The
Delegation-Oriented Architecture and (DOA) [3] and Named Data Networking (NDN)
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[8] projects support to use trusted intermediaries in the network based on their own
security mechanisms and properties.
3.6 UDS evaluation discussion
We summarize our evaluation of the proposals in Table 1. It is observed that within
the schemes there is inherent lack of consideration in the design for usability and
deployability. Rendering the user to believe that it is is communicating with the end
server directly when infact it is communicating with a middlebox results in violation
of trust for the user. The schemes would barely describe the bare bones on how a
deployed scheme would look like to an user. A second observation is that almost
all schemes requires modiﬁcations at the server, client and middlebox end points.
Non server compatibility results in overall less integration of the scheme in the real
world. Requiring server side modiﬁcations forces clients to connect to only servers
that support the scheme. Some schemes fail to oﬀer ﬁne-grained security within the
middleboxes. While some schemes by design apply minimal read and write disclosure
to the middlebox, a majority of them do not discuss it in detail. The evaluation for
majority of the schemes are limited. Some do not have a proof of concept implemen-
tation and the subset of the ones that do have an implementation are not evaluated
extensively over real world data points. However, the reason for this may be at-
tributed as evaluation of a scheme on the Internet is not trivial. There are limited
ways to demonstrate and test ideas on a large scale when there is already a huge
install base that is reluctant to change.
In this thesis, we do not do a quantitative scheme evaluation, that is weights are
not assigned for each property. Simply counting the dots from Table 1 do not endorse
a scheme to be better. However, from our perspective the most important property
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within the framework is Server compatibility. As with existing literature, if a scheme
requires server side changes, the chances of it being deployed in the real world is less
likely. If we look at Table 1 and in particular at the column for server compatibility;
only 5 schemes are server compatible. Two schemes (Ubicrypt and Triraksha in theory
present the same idea and diﬀer slightly in the level of ﬁne-grained conﬁdentiality,
Further, Ubicrypt was developed for the QUIC protocol and we propose Triraksha
for the TLS protocol). The remaining three schemes collectively lack the necessary
security properties and break end-to-end encryption for reasons described in Section
2.2.3. This gives us incentive and the need for a scheme that provides ﬁne-grained
conﬁdentiality and is server compatible.




In this chapter, we discuss and set the context for our scheme: Triraksha. With
Triraksha, we can serve end-to-end encrypted traﬃc in a TLS connection while main-
taining middlebox functionality. We use software modiﬁcations with TLS to enable
ﬁne-grained security and usability at end points for incorporating middleboxes with
TLS. Triraksha allows the middlebox to access plain text content for a TLS connec-
tion but does not allow for modiﬁcations to the traﬃc. In the subsequent sections, we
describe our protocol requirements, key concepts, and the protocol itself. We follow
up with the evaluation in the last section of this chapter.
4.1 Design goals
With Triraksha, we would like to have the security properties oﬀered by TLS with
ﬁne-grained conﬁdentiality for middleboxes. Further, our priority is to build a scheme
that can be easily deployed with existing infrastructure. We target the following in
Triraksha:
1. Entity authentication: A client should be able to authenticate the server and
the middlebox in a TLS connection. The connection used for communicating
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data between each entity in a TLS session must be end-to-end encrypted. The
encryption ciphers used in TLS should not be weak.
2. Payload conﬁdentiality: Any party other than the end points should not be able
to read the plain text send between the client and the server unless it is given
consent by the client or the server.
3. Payload integrity: Clients should be able to verify the data is sent by the server
it is communicating with. Integrity of data should be maintained by end points
and modiﬁcation to data should be detected by the end points.
4. Conﬁgurations and deployment of middleboxes should be on par with recent
practices and be Server compatible. There should be minimal change to existing
protocols/software in order to maximize deployment for the scheme.
5. The middlebox should not be able to modify the traﬃc. It should comply with
Minimal write access.
6. Read/write privileges for a middlebox on encrypted traﬃc should be connection
speciﬁc and should be set by the user. An user should be able to opt out of the
communication channel if he would not like a middlebox to inspect his traﬃc.
7. The user should be aware of the middlebox in the connection.
In summary, we would like Triraksha to be compatible with existing infrastruc-
ture using minimal software/hardware modiﬁcations. The properties should incorpo-
rate and satisfy the security oﬀered by TLS and give privileges for read permissions
and no privilege for write permissions to the middlebox for a connection. Atleast, one
of the end points should authenticate the middlebox and the user should be aware of
the middlebox in the connection.
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4.1.1 Threat model
Scheme and third party attacker: Triraksha relies on the security properties
of TLS for an encrypted connection between a client and server. All entities in
the scheme execute the protocol correctly and do not leak information to an entity
outside of the scheme. Triraksha relies on the browser/TLS library for existing TLS
authentication techniques to detect an untrusted connection (through the existing
browser warning signs). A third party adversary in our scheme is an active network
attacker. He is computationally bound and can attempt to intercept, alter, or insert
packets during any phase of the session. Our scheme does not defend against denial
of service attacks and side channel attacks on network protocols. The adversary does
not have access to private keys of servers. The server and the client do not collude in
any way.
Middlebox and user: The middlebox can attempt to modify or read the plaintext
from the encrypted traﬃc in the end-to-end connection. The middlebox trusts the
encryption keys provided by the client. A ‘malicious user’ can send garbage TLS en-
cryption keys for a connection to the middlebox. The middlebox trusts the encryption
keys provided by the client for a given grace period until it is provided with the master
secret used in TLS negotiations (see Chapter 5 for details). A ‘malicious/defaulting
user’ can attempt to bypass the Triraksha protocol.
4.2 Triraksha overview and architecture
Overview: To achieve the requirements of Triraksha, we allow clients to connect to
a server only if they provide the middlebox with the TLS secrets for that connection.
We deﬁne TLS secrets as the symmetric session encryption keys/IVs that are used
to encrypt/decrypt data packets for that speciﬁc TLS session. Individually sharing a
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TLS encryption key for a session implies that the middlebox can inspect TLS traﬃc
for that session. Further, the client can communicate eﬀectively with a server only if
it provides the TLS secrets. In our scheme Triraksha, we are interested in application
layer middleboxes that are capable of inspecting the traﬃc but cannot modify it.
Application layer middleboxes are typically implemented at a common gateway for
all clients in an organization’s network. The gateway typically implements application
layer functionality like packet inspection, content ﬁltering, audit logging etc. In large
organization networks, a gateway can be a network wide proxy. In our scheme, our
middlebox is a gateway which implements a packet inspection service on an TLS
connection between a server and a client.
Example use cases: The concept our systems presents is best put to use in enter-
prise environments. In an enterprise environment, the need to inspect TLS traﬃc is
essential to mandate network policies. The Triraksha middlebox can act as a corpo-
rate ﬁrewall without having clients install root certiﬁcates. An IDS/IPS device that
currently ignores encrypted traﬃc or relies on Split TLS can now have access to the
plain text in a TLS connection by adopting Triraksha. Institutions and home devices
can use Triraksha as a parental ﬁltering device to block inappropriate content. On
a general note, Triraksha can be adopted for application layer middleboxes that re-
quire only read access in a TLS connection. Following the examples (demonstrated in
mcTLS [59]) for middleboxes that require read access in connections, we picture the
Triraksha middlebox to be used as a load balancer, packet pacer and WAN optimizer.
In Triraksha, we only give read permissions to the middlebox. A majority of the
middleboxes which provide functionality over HTTP/TCP messages between end
points only need read access to the request/response headers and body [59]. Further,
if a middlebox has write permissions then there is no way to maintain integrity for
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the data with the current HTTPS protocol. Hence, with Triraksha we disallow write
access to the middlebox. The Triraksha middlebox cannot be used as a data cache
or data compressor. TLS uses MACs for content integrity between the client and
the server. The MACs are speciﬁc to a client-server connection, therefore no caching
of HTTPS content is possible without signiﬁcant changes to the way HTTPS works.
With Triraksha, deployability is one of our design goals and we do not make changes
to HTTPS. We suggest the reader to look at SSL Splitting [51] for further discussion
on this.
Architecture: Figure 3 represents the architecture for Triraksha. Triraksha serves
end-to-end encryption using TLS between a client and a server while still allowing
the middlebox to inspect packet payload. The Triraksha middlebox initially allows
any client to communicate TLS handshake packets and TLS cipher key exchange
packets with the server but drops TLS application data packets. Selective blocking
of TLS packets is done at the network level by ﬁrewall rules. With user consent and
successful completion of a TLS handshake, the client leaks the TLS encryption keys
for a connection to the middlebox in a separate secure connection. On receipt of the
TLS encryption keys, the middlebox will allow TLS application data packets to pass
for the respective connection. The client and the server communicate with each other
like in regular TLS for that TLS connection while the Triraksha middlebox uses the
encryption key to decrypt the encrypted traﬃc and gets access to the plain text. This
allows the middlebox to enforce its inspection policies while still maintaining a sense
of end-to-end encryption between the client and the server.
Compared to Split TLS where once a root certiﬁcate is installed and the mid-
dlebox has complete access to the traﬃc for all the connections, Triraksha oﬀers
ﬁne-grained security. We would like to note that the trust level between the client
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and the Triraksha middlebox is stricter than the trust between the client and the
Split TLS middlebox. Speciﬁcally in Triraksha, the client controls for which connec-
tion the middlebox can have access to the plain text by sharing only the encryption
key for the TLS session. Further, the middlebox can never modify the traﬃc. In
Triraksha, the trust on the middlebox is minimized but not null. While middlebox
discovery is out of scope in this thesis, we assume that the user/client is aware of the
middlebox and explicitly provides trust/authenticates the middlebox in a separate
connection. Speciﬁc to the Triraksha implementation, the user may learn the public
key/FTP/SSH password of the middlebox out-of-band. For example, for a corporate
network, the public key/password for the middlebox connection might be given on a
piece of paper or in an email.
Figure 3: Architecture of the Triraksha protocol.
On a design level, the Triraksha protocol is faster than Split TLS. Split TLS requires
two TLS handshakes to perform to establish the connection between the client and
the server, while the Triraksha protocol needs only one TLS handshake to establish a
connection between the client and the server. The connection between the client and
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the middlebox for sending keys is long lived and needs to be established only once.
Once application data is ﬂowing, Split TLS has to do an encryption and decryption
for every record. Speciﬁcally, the middlebox ﬁrst decrypts the data sent by the client,
performs its functionality and then re-encrypts this data to be send to the server.
Similarly these operations are performed for messages sent from the server to the
client. With Triraksha, the decryption operation (where the middlebox get access to
the plain text) is non halting. The decryption is performed for encrypted data logged
by the client and does not actively block application data packets for the connection.
We now proceed to explain how our scheme functions by discussing the handshake
phase and the record phase of Triraksha in detail.
4.2.1 Triraksha handshake protocol
The Triraksha handshake is similar to the TLS handshake and can make use of all
the cipher suites and extensions associated with TLS.
The Triraksha handshake is initiated by the client and allows it to:
1. Authenticate the server.
2. Negotiate a symmetric session key and a cipher suite with the server.
3. Allow the user to leak TLS secrets to a middlebox.
Figure 4 represents the Triraksha handshake.
Handshake steps: As in TLS, the Triraksha client opens a TCP connection and
sends a TLS ClientHello message. The ClientHello message contains the following: (1)
the maximum protocol version that the client wishes to support (2) the ‘client random’
(32 bytes, out of which 28 are suppose to be generated with a cryptographically strong
number generator) (3) the ‘session ID’ (in case the client wants to resume a session
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Figure 4: Triraksha handshake.
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in an abbreviated handshake) (4) the list of ‘cipher suites’ that the client supports,
ordered by client preference (5) the list of compression algorithms that the client
knows of, ordered by client preference (6) some optional extensions.
The middlebox simply forwards the ClientHello to the server and logs the client
random, the source IP address, source port and destination IP address of the Clien-
tHello packet. The client random is treated as unique to the TLS connection. For
conciseness in the thesis, we refer to this process of logging the client random as
‘Middlebox ClientHello dissection’. The format for the log ﬁle described above is:
XXXXX source IP address source port destination IP address
XXXX is the client random in hex value of the ClientHello
Figure 5: Format of log ﬁle from Middlebox ClientHello dissection.
The server responds to the ClientHello with a ServerHello which contains the fol-
lowing: (1) the protocol version that the client and server will use (2) the ‘server
random’ (32 bytes, with 28 random bytes) (3) the session ID for this connection (4)
the cipher suite that will be used (5) the compression algorithm that will be used
(6) optionally, some extensions. Along with the ServerHello, the server also sends
its Certiﬁcate which contains the server’s public key, the ServerKeyExchange which
contains the server’s value for key exchange and a ServerHelloDone. Following the
ServerHelloDone, the client responds with the ClientKeyExchange which is the client
part of the key exchange. Using the data from the key exchange messages, the client
and server establishes a pre master secret, which is further used to generate a master
secret. The master secret is used in combination with the client random and server
random and fed to a pseudo random function to generate a key block. The key block
is split into sets of keys: encryption keys, MAC keys and IVs. The keys are used in
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the subsequent messages to encrypt/decrypt data. The client also sends a Change-
CipherSpec message, which is a separate TLS record type. The ChangeCipherSpec
marks the point at which the client switches to the newly negotiated cipher suite
and keys. The subsequent records from the client will then be encrypted. The client
sends a ‘Finished’ message, which is a cryptographic checksum computed over all
previous handshake messages (from both the client and server). When the server
receives that message and veriﬁes the checksum, the server obtains a proof that it has
indeed communicated with the same client all along. The ‘Finished’ message protects
the handshake from alterations by a third party. The server responds with its own
ChangeCipherSpec and Finished messages at which point the handshake is complete.
In Triraksha, the user decides if he wants a middlebox to inspect traﬃc for a TLS
connection. He makes the decision before attempting to connect with the server.
Following the decision to support packet inspection, the client logs the sets of keys
generated from the key block during the key exchange for each TLS connection made
by the client. Speciﬁcally, the data logged is a set of encryption keys and IVs. In
Triraksha, the MAC keys are not logged and/or shared with the middlebox. The
client uses the client random from the ClientHello message as a unique identiﬁer and
associates it with the keys. From now on, we refer to a set of client random and
TLS symmetric encryption keys and IVs for a connection as the TLS secrets for that
connection. The TLS secrets for the respective connection are stored on the client
computer. The client authenticates the middlebox in a separate connection and leaks
the TLS secrets to the middlebox on user consent. The client can authenticate the
middlebox using any secure authentication process like certiﬁcate validation etc.
To summarize, the Triraksha handshake achieves the following:
1. The client authenticates the server.
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2. The client does the TLS handshake negotiations with the server. Speciﬁcally,
the client establishes a symmetric encryption key with the server for encryption
of TLS record packets.
3. The client authenticates the middlebox.
4. The user consents to leaking TLS secrets for a connection and following the
decision, the client leaks the TLS secrets to the middlebox in a separate channel.
4.2.2 Triraksha record protocol
We now describe the additions we make to the TLS record protocol. Like in the
handshake phase, the additions are external to the TLS record protocol in itself.
The Triraksha client takes payload from a higher level protocol and sets up an
environment for encrypting/decrypting the data. The client breaks the payload into
blocks. Like in regular TLS, a payload in a block can consists of at most 16384 bytes.
The client optionally compresses the block and then depending on the cryptographic
primitives in the cipher suite, it applies a MAC and encrypts the block (the block is
MAC and encrypted with the symmetric MAC and encryption key from the hand-
shake phase). Triraksha supports use of any encryption and MAC algorithms that
are supported by TLS. The encrypted block is appended with a TLS record header
and transmitted to the end point (server) as a TLS application data packet. After
reception at the other end point, the same operations are performed to the packet in
reverse order (decryption, MAC veriﬁcation, decompression, reassembly and sends it
to a higher layer).
In Triraksha, the middlebox drops all TLS application data packets sent by the
client until the client leaks the TLS secrets to the gateway for that TLS session. To
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send TLS application data packets, the user would have to consent to leak the TLS
secrets for a TLS connection. Following the decision, the client would have leaked
the TLS secrets during the handshake phase.
The middlebox matches the client random in the TLS secrets it received by the
client with the client randoms logged during ‘Middlebox ClientHello dissection’. A
successful match implies that the middlebox received the TLS secrets for a TLS
connection and it should allow TLS application data packets to pass through for that
connection. The middlebox now adds a ﬁrewall rule for the respective IP addresses
and port (logged from ‘Middlebox ClientHello dissection’) and allows TLS application
data packets to pass through for that connection. A client and server now continue
to transmit TLS application data packets as in a regular TLS connection.
The middlebox uses the TLS secrets to decrypt the respective TLS application data
packets to get access to the plain text. The middlebox however, cannot modify the
data as it does not have the MAC keys for the TLS connection. This also implies that
the middlebox must trust the secrets provided by the client. We discuss an extended
threat model in more detail in Section 10.
To summarize, the Triraksha record protocol achieves the following:
1. Allows a client and a server to communicate TLS application data packets.
2. Provides read access to the middlebox in the TLS connection.
3. Provides no write privilege to the middlebox in the TLS connection.
4. The client and server can authenticate and maintain integrity of the TLS ap-
plication data packets transmitted between them.
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4.3 Implementation setup and discussion
The section discusses the setup for the implementation, the software modiﬁcations
and implementation details for Triraksha. We discuss the modiﬁcations made at each
end point based on the design decisions from the previous section.
A proof of concept for Triraksha was implemented on two computers running
Ubuntu 14.01. Figure 6 represents the Triraksha implementation setup. The middle-
box is set up such that it can connect to the Internet on a network interface (NI1).
The client computer is connected to the proxy using a USB to ethernet adapter and
communicates with the proxy on the respective network interface (NI2). The network
interfaces NI1 and NI2 are bridged on the proxy computer hence, giving the client
access to Internet. We describe how the client and the middlebox are implemented to
support the scheme. Our implementation requires no server side modiﬁcations and
should be compatible with all servers supporting TLS.
Figure 6: Triraksha implementation.
1Machine conﬁgurations described in the Appendix.
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4.3.1 Client support for Triraksha
To enable Triraksha on the client end, we make software modiﬁcations such that
the client computer can leak the TLS secrets to the gateway securely. On the client
computer, TLS session key logging was achieved by the use of the SSLKEYLOGFILE
variable which is supported by most popular browsers and SSL libraries (like Chrome,
Firefox, OpenSSL, mbedTLS, GnuTLS etc). The SSLKEYLOGFILE variable sets
up an environment such that every time an application makes a TLS connection, the
underlying SSL library writes the TLS session master secret/pre-master secret to the
environment variable location. The format for the SSLKEYLOGFILE is a series of
records with the following formats [20]:
1. ‘RSA xxxx yyyy’
Where xxxx are the ﬁrst 8 bytes of the encrypted pre-master secret (hex-
encoded) and yyyy is the cleartext pre-master secret (hex-encoded).
2. ‘RSA Session-ID:xxxx Master-Key:yyyy’
Where xxxx is the SSL session ID (hex-encoded) and yyyy is the cleartext
master secret (hex-encoded).
3. ‘PMS CLIENT RANDOM xxxx yyyy’
Where xxxx is the client random from the ClientHello (hex-encoded) and yyyy
is the cleartext pre-master secret (hex-encoded).
4. ‘CLIENT RANDOM xxxx yyyy’
Where xxxx is the client random from the ClientHello (hex-encoded) and yyyy
is the cleartext master secret (hex-encoded).
In Triraksha, we do not share the negotiated TLS master secret or TLS pre master
secret with the middlebox as it can be used to generate the encryption keys and the
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MAC keys. To enable ﬁne-grained conﬁdentiality, we share only the encryption keys
and not MAC keys. However, the SSLKEYLOGFILE does not provide a format to
do so. A workaround for this is to modify an underlying TLS library or browser
source code to print out the TLS secrets. However, by making this implementation
choice we minimize adoption as the scheme would be adopted only if the modiﬁed
library/browser would be used by the enterprise.
Instead of making changes to a browser/TLS library, we make use of Wireshark [20],
a de-facto network protocol analyzer. In Triraksha, we use it to exﬁltrate TLS secrets
for a TLS connection. Wireshark is set up such as to capture network packets on
the client computer and log all TLS packets for a connection. Wireshark requires the
negotiated TLS master key for a connection to generate the TLS session keys (TLS
secrets). The TLS master key for a connection is provided via the SSLKEYLOG-
FILE environment variable. The Wireshark TLS dissector waits for the handshake
to complete and calculates the TLS sessions keys once it logs a ChangeCipherSpec
message from the client end. The Wireshark TLS dissector was modiﬁed to print the
TLS secrets to a ﬁle on the client computer. It should be noted that the ClientHello
random, ServerHello random and master secret are not always suﬃcient to calculate
the session keys. According to [27] RFC 7627 TLS Extended Master Secret extension,
one needs to log the full handshake to generate the secrets and hence Wireshark waits
until a client ChangeCipherSpec message is logged.
An user can control if he wants to leak the TLS secrets for a connection/all connec-
tions by simply exporting the client application with the SSLKEYLOGFILE variable.
A script is run to leak the keys to the middlebox for each time Wireshark prints the
TLS secrets to the ﬁle. The Triraksha client opens a connection and sends the ﬁle
using ‘rsync’ over ‘SSH’ [14]. rysnc is a fast and versatile ﬁle copying tool. It can
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copy locally, to/from another host over any remote shell, or to/from a remote rsync
daemon. It uses the delta-transfer algorithm, which reduces the amount of data sent
over the network by sending only the diﬀerences between the source ﬁles and the
existing ﬁles in the destination. The rsync connection authenticates the middlebox.
Other implementation choices that we could use for authentication between the client
and the middlebox are to use a TLS client-server/SCP connection.
4.3.2 Middlebox support for Triraksha
To enable the middlebox to support Triraksha, the following need to be implemented:
1. Selective blocking of TLS packets on the network.
2. Receive TLS secrets from client and verify if they are associated with a legiti-
mate TLS connection made by the client.
3. Decrypt encrypted traﬃc using the TLS secrets.
4.3.2.1 Selective ﬁltering of TLS packets
Selective ﬁltering of TLS content type is done on the network level with the help
of iptables [5] and IP sets [4]. iptables is a Linux based ﬁrewall and is used to set
up, maintain, and inspect the tables of packet ﬁlter rules in the Linux kernel. We
leverage iptables with the u32 module to achieve ﬁltering of TLS handshake and
cipher key exchange traﬃc from TLS application data packets. We also note that it
is possible to drop TLS application data packets using the string module for iptables.
However, this may result in false positives as the string module compares a particular
string anywhere in the packet. The u32 module allows for more ﬁne-grained pattern
matching as it allows one to check packet payload at a particular position in the
packet bytes. We use u32 to check for TLS headers in the ﬁrst few bytes of the TCP
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payload. With the u32 module, we oﬀset to the TCP payload and check the TLS
header of a packet. TLS application data packets have the header value 17. The
header value is followed by the TLS version used for the connection. The value for
TLS 1.2 is 303. The following command is used to block application data packets for
TLS 1.2.
iptables -I OUTPUT 1 \ -p tcp \! -f --dport 443 \ -m state
--state ESTABLISHED -m u32 --u32 \
"0>>22&0 x3C@ 12>>26&0 x3C@ 0 & 0xFFFFFF00 =0 x17030300 -j
DROP
IP sets is used to set up, maintain and inspect so called IP sets in the Linux kernel.
With IP sets we can store multiple IP addresses and port numbers and match against
the collection by iptables as a whole. IP sets helps eliminate the performance penalty
faced by iptables when adding IP addresses dynamically. With IP sets only one match
rule is added to iptables instead of cluttering the ﬁrewall with multiple rules. IP sets
prevents duplicate rules from being added by default. With this setup the middlebox
allows all TLS handshake, TLS cipher key exchange and TLS alert traﬃc but blocks
TLS application data packets for a TLS connection.
4.3.2.2 Associating TLS secrets to a TLS connection
To check if the TLS secrets received from the client are associated with a legitimate
TLS connection made by the client, we build a program called ‘TLS hello dumper’
that uses libpcap to record and dissect TLS traﬃc, in particular the Hello messages
in the TLS handshake. We log for each ClientHello message the client random, the
source IP address, source port and destination IP address of the ClientHello packet.
On subsequent and successful completion of the TLS handshake, TLS secrets are
generated by the client computer and are transferred to the middlebox using rsync.
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The format in which the TLS secrets are send to the middlebox is as follows:
Client Random XXXXX
Client encryption key YYYY
Server encryption key YYYY
Client IV YYYY
Server IV YYYY
where XXXX and YYYY are respective values.
The client random is used as a unique identiﬁer to associate the secrets for a TLS
connection. The TLS client random is a random string of 32 bytes unique to each
TLS connection. The client and the server are allowed to exchange TLS application
data packets only if there is a client random with the TLS secrets that matches
with a client random logged by the middlebox. A script running on the middlebox
matches the logged client randoms (from TLS hello dumper) with the client random
presented with the keys sent by the client. This process allows the middlebox to link
a TLS connection with the TLS secrets provided by the client for that particular TLS
session. If a successful match occurs, it allows traﬃc for that pair of IP addresses and
respective port to pass through. We track the TCP state of the TLS connection by
inspecting the TCP headers of the packets. We remove a rule from the ﬁrewall when
we detect a packet having a TCP FIN/TCP RST header in that connection. A single
TCP connection encapsulates a single TLS connections. When a TLS connections
ends, we remove the rule and by doing this we stop a client from attempting to initiate
a TLS connection over a previously added ﬁrewall rule.
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4.3.2.3 Decrypting TLS traﬃc at the middlebox
In this section, we ﬁrst discuss our current implementation choices and then follow
up with some alternative implementation decisions that could have been made.
To enable the middlebox to get access to the plain text from the encrypted traf-
ﬁc, the Wireshark TLS dissector for Wireshark version 2.2 was modiﬁed and run on
the middlebox to read the TLS secrets received from the client. On successful read,
Wireshark would decrypt TLS application data packets sent between the client and
the server. Wireshark by design uses the SSLKEYLOGFILE to consume a master
secret for a TLS connection and then generate TLS session keys. This process is done
whenever it detects a TLS ChangeCipherSpec message for that connection. In our
design, we feed Wireshark a dummy SSLKEYLOGFILE (a ﬁle that contains a fake
master secret for each client random logged by the middlebox). An entry is added to
the dummy SSLKEYLOGFILE only if the middlebox received TLS secrets for that
connection. Whenever a client cipher key exchange packet is detected, Wireshark
attempts to consume the master secret from a dummy SSLKEYLOGFILE. If Wire-
shark is unsuccessful in ﬁnding the master secret, it will continue to poll the dummy
SSLKEYLOGFILE for 0.8 seconds (we set the threshold time to generate keys on
the client and send it to the middlebox as 0.8 seconds). On successful read of the
fake master secret, Wireshark generates TLS session keys using the fake master se-
cret. These session keys are then overwritten by the TLS session keys that were sent
from the client as TLS secrets. They are loaded into Wireshark process memory as
a decoder for the rest of the TLS session. On subsequent exchange of TLS applica-
tion data packets, the respective decoder is used to decrypt all TLS application data
packets. MAC veriﬁcation for packets are set to be ignored during this time.
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The implementation eﬀort involved writing multiple scripts ( 900 LoC) to enable
functionality for our protocol and understanding and modifying parts of the Wire-
shark TLS dissectors which is written over 10,000 LoC. Another possible implemen-
tation choice that we could have made is to write a custom dissector that waits for
the TLS secrets from the client and interprets the TLS record layer separately before
the Wireshark TLS dissector is invoked. With our current design, we minimize the
changes made to the Wireshark TLS dissector and attempt to load the secrets into
memory exactly once when the cipher key exchange happens. Speciﬁcally, Wireshark
uses a decoder variable to decrypt TLS traﬃc for a session. The secrets are loaded
into the decoder variable when a cipher key exchange is logged by Wireshark. Once
the decoder is set, it is used to decrypt application data packets for the entire TLS
session. The decision to let Wireshark read a dummy SSLKEYLOGFILE and gen-
erate keys before overwriting them is because we wanted to make minimum changes
to the dissector code. It is possible to load the keys from the client into the decoder
variable directly by simply bypassing and commenting out the irrelevant code. How-
ever, the time taken for this step to read a dummy keylog ﬁle and generate secrets is
negligible (in ms). The process of reading a SSLKEYLOGFILE provides for a neat
GUI functionality to be used at a later stage for determining integrity of the TLS
keys and data. Speciﬁcally, if we would like to verify the integrity of the payload
(MAC veriﬁcation) and the integrity of TLS encryption keys, the client must submit
his end of the SSLKEYLOGFILE (which contains the correct master secret). The
client SSLKEYLOGFILE can then be loaded via the GUI and MAC veriﬁcation can
be performed for the TLS application data packets.
We also note that there are a number of potential implementations for the Trirak-
sha middlebox. We explore a number of potential projects like using NFQUEUE [10],
Scapy [15], nDPI [9], mitmproxy [7] and Surciata as an IPS. However, with most of
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these projects we would have required to change underlying libraries (which would
result in decreased deployability) or account for TCP and TLS reassembly. We choose
Wireshark as it a de-facto network protocol analyzer with state of the art implemen-
tation for TCP, TLS reassembly and TLS decryption. Our current implementation
is portable to existing TLS libraries and browsers. Ubicrypt is the only other scheme
in the literature to have a proof of concept which can be adopted with web browsers.
However, even their proof of concept was implemented over a virtual network.
4.4 Evaluation
To evaluate Triraksha, we aim to understand the following:
1. Does Triraksha function correctly?
2. What are the performance overheads for Triraksha?
We begin by ﬁrst understanding the goals achieved by Triraksha, follow up with
functionality evaluation and ﬁnally end with evaluating the overhead of using the
scheme when compared to a regular end-to-end TLS connection.
4.4.1 Design principle compliance
To understand how Triraksha achieves its design goals and fares against other schemes,
we assess Triraksha with the UDS framework. The scheme requires software mod-
iﬁcations only at the client and the middlebox end. It does not require server side
modiﬁcations and supports Server compatibility. The number of TLS handshakes
between a client and a server in Triraksha is one handshake (in Triraksha, the TLS
handshake is simply extended to leak TLS secrets to the middlebox) which is the same
as in a regular end-to-end TLS connection. It hence complies with No signiﬁcant la-
tency. Triraksha allows for TLS negotiation only between the client and the server.
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The client further authenticates the server (during TLS negotiation by checking the
server certiﬁcate) and middlebox (by using SSH with the rsync connections). It hence
complies with Server authentication, Middlebox recognition and TLS protocol nego-
tiations. Triraksha provides ﬁne-grained security as it lets the middlebox access to
plain text data only for the connections in which the TLS session secrets are leaked to
the middlebox. It complies with Connection speciﬁc interception. Triraksha does not
comply with Minimal read disclosure as the Middlebox has access to the plain text
for connections that the clients leaks TLS secrets. It complies with Minimal write
access as the MAC keys are not shared with the middlebox and no modiﬁcations
can be made to the data sent between the client and the server. It relies on existing
and familiar browser mechanisms to display server’s certiﬁcate and warning signs for
insecure connections. Existing schemes like DANE, HSTS etc. that are implemented
by an application can also be used in Triraksha. The middlebox is preconﬁgured
to act as a network intermediate (gateway) for a client and hence partially complies
with Middlebox discovery visibility and Infrequent errors or open fails. When the user
switches to a new network, the middlebox would no longer be a gateway in the new
network (by default) and hence supports Middlebox persistence visibility.
4.4.2 Experimental setup
We setup a test environment to evaluate functionality and performance for Triraksha
based on the implementation described in Section 4.3. We test Triraksha by making
web requests from our university network under two scenarios:
1. HTTP requests to local servers, and
2. HTTP requests to remote servers.
A local server is a server in our local network using the OpenSSL s server program
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[11] while remote web servers represent real world web sites. We use the Chromium
and Curl to make single/multiple HTTP web requests to remote and local servers.
Chromium uses CCA9 also referenced as ECDHE RSA WITH POLYCHACHA20 SHA
or a variation of this suite as the default cipher for its connections. This cipher suite
is not recognized by the Wireshark TLS dissector and hence we blacklist the ci-
phers: CCAX (where X is a numerical variation). All other cipher suites oﬀered by
Chromium are acceptable. With Curl, we simply use the command line argument
CIPHERS: HIGH to set the cipher suite for the connection. Unless speciﬁed, exper-
iments run in the environments consist of a 100 runs for which we report the mean
or cumulative result. During the run of these experiments, we do not record the
deviation for the average (the numbers for the deviation for the average recorded is
minimal). While the environment was setup to make web request automatically to
a large number of websites, we perform the experiments manually by making web
requests randomly to URLs from the list of Alexa’s top 100 websites. Further details
on this are provided in the subsequent sections. The benchmarks provided in the
performance evaluation are speciﬁc to our proof of concept and not to the Triraksha
design. The numbers may possibly improve with some other implementation.
4.4.3 Functionality evaluation
To evaluate the functionality for Triraksha, we address the following questions:
1. Can the Triraksha middlebox perform packet inspection correctly?
2. Is Triraksha robust?
We answer these questions by ﬁrst describing the methodology for the functionality
evaluation.
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Methodology: We picked websites randomly from the list of Alexa’s top 100
websites. We download ﬁles of varying sizes (a few Kb upto 10 Mb) using Curl when
requests were made to a local server. When connecting to remote servers with Curl,
only the headers and index ﬁle were downloaded. For Chromium, we simply open the
website and let the browser load all objects for the main page of the website. We run
experiments manually with Curl and Chromium on approximately 20-30 domains. To
test packet inspection, we set the ground truth as plain text decrypted by Wireshark
on the client computer under two models. Under model 1, our goal was to check if the
hash of the decrypted content for a middlebox and client under Triraksha matches
with the hash of the decrypted content for a client in a regular TLS connection
(ground truth). Under model 2, our goal is to test if the decrypted content match for
the client and the middlebox when both are used with Triraksha.
Model 1: Under model 1, the experiment is run twice for a single web request. For
the ﬁrst experiment, the scheme is a regular end-to-end TLS connection. We enable
decryption with Wireshark on the client end and print out all decrypted content for
TLS application data packets in hex values to a ﬁle. We calculate a hash of the ﬁle
and store it. In the second experiment, we then perform the same web request under
Triraksha and print the decrypted content on the middlebox (as hex values). A hash
of the ﬁle was calculated and stored.
The hash was done using the Linux sha1sum command and a comparison was
made between the hash of the client decrypted content and the hash of the middle-
box decrypted content. While the comparison process could be automated to test
for a larger number of web requests, we do it manually for two reasons: (1) we are
interested in comparing the decrypted content only for a single web request at a
time. By making multiple web requests, decrypted content for those requests would
be printed to the same ﬁle. The only way to cleanly print out the decrypted content
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for a single web request is to manually re-initate the capture everytime a web request
is made. (2) Making manual web request helped us perform better debugging. It is
easier to understand the Wireshark log for a single web request compared to simul-
taneous multiple requests. Cases in which a match of the hashes does not occur, our
script would further run to verify the discrepancy by printing out the non matching
decrypted content. We then followed up with manual debugging of non matching
decrypted content with the Wireshark SSL debug ﬁle and network log.
Model 2: Under model 2, we run the experiment once for a single web request
under Triraksha. We store the decrypted content at the client and the middlebox end.
We perform a hash of the ﬁle and log it. Similar to model 1, we do the experiments
manually for websites chosen randomly from Alexa’s top 100 list.
Results summary: The hash of the decrypted content matched for the client and
the middlebox under both models for Curl requests. We encountered a known Wire-
shark bug and had to analyze the network logs to understand the exact sequence of
events. After applying a manual solution for the Wireshark bug, the hash for the
decrypted content matched on both the client and the middlebox end.
Discussion: We discuss the results in detail now. Initially, under model 1, the hash
of the decrypted content did not match in any web request made by Curl or Chromium
to local or remote servers. The ﬁle size of the decrypted content on the client was
more than that on the middlebox which implied that the middlebox did not perform
decryption for all TLS application data packets. Our debugging script pointed us to
the matching and non matching content with the packet number (Wireshark frame
number). For Curl requests, we observed that the GET request on the client and the
middlebox were decrypted correctly, however, the middlebox would not decrypt the
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index ﬁle (response text of the server).
On manually debugging the capture ﬁle and understanding the Wireshark SSL
debug log, we ﬁnd the reason for this is due to various retransmissions for TCP/TLS
packets. In every web request, we had a case of a retransmission for the GET request
and the Server ChangeCipherSpec message. We come across bug 9461 [21] in the
Wireshark bug forum which states that Wireshark fails to decrypt TLS packets when
TCP packets fall out of order. In Wireshark, by default the TCP dissector will hand
retransmissions to the subdissector (in this case the SSL dissector) which means that
the subdissector sees the retransmitted data twice. This corrupts the state of the
SSL dissector and is hence is unable to decrypt the TLS application data packets.
The client under a regular TLS connection would decrypt the TLS application data
packets and see the index ﬁle of the website as usually there are no retransmitted
packets in a regular TLS connection. Compared to the previous state, the middlebox
in Triraksha drops packets if a ﬁrewall rule is not present and hence experiences
retransmissions. As a result, Wireshark on the middlebox in Triraksha does not
decrypt the TLS application data packets containing the index ﬁle. A solution to
this is to simply set to ignore the retransmitted packets (done manually by toggling
preference for the packet in the GUI) after which the SSL dissector resets its state and
is able to decrypt packets correctly. The hash of the decrypted content on the client
under a regular end-to-end TLS connection and the hash of the decrypted content on
the middlebox and client under Triraksha matched for all cases when we manually
toggled to ignore retransmitted packets.
Under model 2, our goal was to test if the decrypted content match for the client
and the middlebox when both are used with Triraksha. We follow the same routine
as described in the previous model, and additionally we manually set to ignore the
76
retransmitted packets. We then match the hash of the decrypted content of the
client and the middlebox. The hash of the decrypted content matches in all cases
with Curl. We got a successful match for the hash of the decrypted content for all
experiments with web requests downloading ﬁles of various size from local servers. The
experiments conclude that our script to add ﬁrewall rules and leak TLS secrets to the
middlebox work correctly in the overall implementation. In some cases, experiments
for single web requests made with Chromium did not match. Unlike Curl, the TCP
packets were out of order in many cases with Chromium. Reassembly of packets
did not occur on Wireshark properly and hence led to irregular decryption. In some
cases, we experienced retransmission of packets leading to new fragment overlapping
an old data fragment (TCP fragmentation). After manually ignoring the respective
retransmitted packets and triggering decryption again, the hash of the decrypted
content matched correctly.
It is possible to export HTTP objects from the captured ﬁle in Wireshark. However,
this step requires to stop the capture on the middlebox/client. Also, not all objects
can be exported via the GUI as the ﬁlenames for the exported data does not comply
with the OS ﬁlename policy. A script was run to ﬁnd the hash for all exported objects
in a directory for both the client and the proxy. We observed that the hash for all
media objects were the same.
We also note that in some cases, malformed packet were logged on the middlebox
but not on client and vice versa. We also experienced cases in which there were SSL
timeouts/handshake failures and there was incomplete capture of handshake data
on the client/middlebox. A SSL handshake timeout may occur regardless of using
Triraksha or a regular end-to-end TLS connection. We ignore the experiments for
these cases in our evaluation as they are irregular cases (we experienced these cases
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for a regular end-to-end TLS connection as well).
Robustness for Triraksha To understand robustness for Triraksha, we test Tri-
raksha with diﬀerent test cases. We discuss the test cases brieﬂy.
Test Case 1: A client leaking TLS secrets to the middlebox is always able to
complete the GET request. The response of the GET request from the server is the
same as under a regular TLS connection. This test case checks if the ﬁrewall rules are
correctly put in order and do not block TLS application data packets for a connection
after the client leaks the TLS secrets.
Test Case 2: Functionality check by making two simultaneous connections to the
same domain and see if they are recognized diﬀerently by the middlebox and client.
This test case checks if a client can access resources from a domain (web server) over
a connection in which he leaks the TLS secrets while he opens another connection
(this time does not leaking the TLS secrets) and attempts to access resources from
the same domain (web server).
Our implementation handles this test case by tracking TCP connections. We add
a ﬁrewall rule for a source IP address, destination IP address, source port and des-
tination port and remove the rule when a TCP FIN/RST packet is detected for this
connection. A separate TLS connection to the same IP address will always be opened
over a diﬀerent source port (browser/OS policy). The client cannot use the same
source port and IP address pair to open another TLS connection as a single TCP
connection encapsulates only a single TLS connection. We conﬁrm that a new con-
nection is created with the same (ip.src, ip.dst, tcp.src port, tcp.dst port) after an
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authorized one was closed (either by timeout or by remote server closing the connec-
tion, or by client closing the connection).
Test Case 3: The client always sends the TLS secrets to the middlebox when
the application making the web requests is exported with the SSLKEYLOGFILE.
To test this case, we run a script to make multiple Curl requests to Alexa’s top 5000
websites. After the script is run, we check the hash of the generated TLS secrets on
the client computer and the hash of the TLS secrets received by the middlebox.
Test Case 4: An application not leaking TLS secrets cannot communicate TLS
application data packets with the server and vice versa. This rule checks if the TLS
application data packets are dropped correctly on the respective network interface.
Test Case 5: We send incorrect and correct TLS secrets to the middlebox and
conﬁrm that the decrypted text is respectively garbage/correct in this experiment.
Test Case 6: We verify that a long processing time at the middlebox doesn’t
interfere with the TLS handshake (because of retransmissions, timeouts, several Clien-
tHello sent by browsers at once, etc.).
We evaluate Triraksha on these test cases by running experiments manually. We
made web requests to domains from Alexa’s top 100 list. Initially, some of the test
cases failed (due to retransmission of packets, minor errors in implementation etc.)
but were ﬁxed over the time period of this research. We would like to note that the
test cases were developed to stress test the proof of concept. They were written to
test each components of the Triraksha implementation and if the components interact
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with each other the way they are supposed to. Triraksha successfully passes on all of
these test cases.
4.4.4 Performance evaluation
In this section, we are interested in ﬁnding the overhead incurred by Triraksha com-
pared to a regular end-to-end TLS connection. We start by discussing detailed micro
benchmarks for the client and the middlebox with web requests made with Curl. The
timing information was collected by leveraging Curl’s built-in timing APIs.
Client Performance: How long does it take to generate keys and send it to the
middlebox during the handshake? Table 2 provides some insight into the logistics for
the time taken to generate TLS secrets based on our implementation. We use six
popular websites for our experiments: Youtube, CNN, Twitter, Facebook, YTS and
New York Times. The websites together all have diﬀerent types of media content. On
an average, Wireshark on the client side takes 344 μs to read a SSLKEYLOGFILE,
generate TLS secrets and write them to a ﬁle. We measured the time interval to
run the respective functions collectively by using APIs from the glibc library for this
statistic.
Curl’s appconnect metric gives the time, in seconds, it takes from the start until the
SSL/TCP/ connect/handshake to the remote host is completed. With the Triraksha
handshake, the handshake includes sending the TLS secrets to the middlebox. On
an average, sending the TLS secrets using rsync for a single Curl request takes 280
ms. Table 3 contains statistics for the rync transfers. Table 4 represents the statistics
for Curl’s appconnect metric. The metrics in Table 4 were established over a period
of 5 runs. From the table, we observe that the Triraksha handshake has little or no
1Deﬁnitions for Curl’s APIs are in the Appendix.
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overhead compared to a regular TLS connection. This is expected as we do not make
any changes to the TLS handshake itself. The TLS handshake protocol for Triraksha
and a regular TLS connection is the same and the key generation process and transfer
of TLS secrets do not aﬀect the handshake. There is only network latency observed in
Curl’s appconnect metric for Triraksha and a regular TLS connection. The overhead
incurred in the Triraksha handshake is attributed to sending the TLS secrets to the
middlebox.
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Table 2: The time taken to read the SSLKEYLOGFILE and generate TLS secrets.
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Table 3: The time taken to send TLS secrets using rsync.
Summary: There is little overhead for the Triraksha handshake when compared
to a regular end-to-end TLS handshake. The additional overhead in Triraksha hand-
shake is from the latency of sending the TLS secrets from the client to the middlebox.
Middlebox performance: When it comes to evaluating the performance for the
middlebox, we are interested in addressing two questions: How long does it take to
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Website TLS (ms) Triraksha appconnect (ms) Total time Triraksha (ms)
Youtube 105 136 419
Twitter 179 176 459
CNN 172 166 452
Facebook 215 184 478
YTS 31 37 323
New York Times 102 158 446
Table 4: The time taken for Curl’s time appconnect (handshake time) and the total
Triraksha handshake time.
create a dummy SSLKEYLOGFILE and add rules to the ﬁrewall once the middlebox
receives the TLS secrets? and What is the total time taken to complete a single Curl
request with Triraksha? Table 5 gives details for the time taken to execute the scripts
and add rules to the ﬁrewall. The time taken by IP sets to add ﬁrewall rules is minimal
(an average latency of 12 ms). We do not measure the time taken for packets to be
matched against the respective ﬁrewall rules.
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Table 5: The time taken to create a dummy SSLKEYLOGFILE and add rules to
the ﬁrewall.
We now measure and show the time taken to complete the entire Curl request.
The time taken to complete the entire Curl request consists of the time taken to
do a DNS lookup, time for the handshake to complete, sending the TLS secrets
to the middlebox, adding a ﬁrewall rule and the time taken to transfer the server
response for the website. Table 6 shows detailed statistics for a website. The major
diﬀerence between Triraksha and a regular end-to-end TLS connection lies in Curl’s
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‘time starttransfer’. time starttransfer is the time, in seconds, from the start until
the ﬁrst byte is transferred. This includes the time taken for the handshake, redirects,
the DNS name lookup and the time the server needed to calculate the result. Table
8 provides a summarized version of the total time taken for the six websites used in
previous experiments.
From the tables, we observe that the time taken to start transfer for application
data packets initially is signiﬁcant. On average, an overhead of 1.2 seconds occurs
across the websites. On manual analysis (for each website) of the packet capture
running with Wireshark, we ﬁnd re-transmitted packets at the TCP and TLS layer.
Speciﬁcally, the GET request from the client is retransmitted multiple times (3-10
times) and the ChangeCipherSpec from the server is logged as a TCP spurious retrans-
mission in all instances. TCP spurious retransmission indicates that the sender sent
a retransmission for data that was already acknowledged by the receiver and for some
reason, the sender interpreted that a packet was lost, so it sends it again. Further, the
retransmission time roughly doubles for every retransmitted packet (adaptive TCP
retransmission policy). The time diﬀerence in establishing a TLS connection with
Triraksha and a regular end-to-end TLS connection is attributed to re-transmissions
of packets. We should note that time starttransfer is the time taken to ﬁrst byte
(TTFB) for the TLS application data packet. If the connection were to remain open
and a resource was downloaded from the server using the same TLS connection then
the diﬀerence between the two schemes would be negligible. Table 10 show statistics
Property End-to-End TLS Triraksha
time starttransfer 0.503 seconds 1.839 seconds
time total 0.523 seconds 1.942 seconds
size header (at client) 763 bytes 763 bytes
size download (at client) 34548 bytes 34548 bytes
Table 6: The time and size for a Curl request for yts.ag.
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Property End-to-End TLS Triraksha
time starttransfer 0.519 seconds 1.32 seconds
time total 0.664 seconds 1.877 seconds
size header (at client) 1364 bytes 1364 bytes
size download (at client) 309066 bytes 309066 bytes
Table 7: The time and size for a Curl request for Twitter.com.
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Table 8: The total time taken for a Curl request compared to a regular end-to-end
TLS connection.
Property End-to-End TLS Triraksha
time starttransfer 0.22 seconds 0.9 seconds
time total 0.29 seconds 0.906 seconds
size header (at client) 331 bytes 331 bytes
size download (at client) 66459 bytes 66459 bytes
Table 9: The time and size for downloading a Thunderbird addon: cherami.xpi.
Property End-to-End TLS Triraksha
time starttransfer 0.16 seconds 0.19 seconds
time total 39.03 seconds 39.12 seconds
size header (at client) 394 bytes 394 bytes
size download (at client) 33852374 bytes 33852374 bytes
Table 10: The time and size for downloading a repo tarball from OpenSSL.
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for the timing diﬀerence in downloading a larger ﬁle. The time diﬀerence between
Triraksha and a regular TLS connection for downloading a 33MB ﬁle is 0.09 seconds.
The diﬀerence is very small and attributed to network latency.
Summary: There is an overhead initially only for establishing the TLS connection.
Once the TLS connection is established and ﬁrewall rules are added, other resources
from the server take the same time to be downloaded as a regular end-to-end TLS
connection.
Performance overhead with browser requests: Triraksha can be adopted with
popular desktop web browsers like Chromium, Firefox etc. To understand how bench-
marks with a Curl request transform with real world browsers, we evaluate Triraksha
with web requests made from the Chromium browser. We choose websites from the
list of Alexa’s top 100 websites. We record all information from the network log
using Chromium’s developer tool and the decrypted plain text by Wireshark. For
each single web request, we record logistics for the objects downloaded and uploaded.
The information was stored as a HTTP Archive format ﬁle (HAR) and was analyzed
with a HAR viewer. Tables 11 and 12 show performance benchmarks of two popular
websites for Triraksha compared to a regular end-to-end TLS connection.
Property End-to-End TLS Triraksha
No. of requests 26 51
Onload time 1388 ms 5832 ms
SSL time 365 ms 412 ms
Uploaded data 15273 bytes 29365 bytes
Downloaded data 796098 bytes 3456866 bytes
Table 11: The time and size for a Chromium request (page global data) for
Amazon.ca.
1Deﬁnitions for parameters involved with browser experiments are in the Appendix.
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Property End-to-End TLS Triraksha
No. of requests 36 43
Onload time 2401 ms 10220 ms
SSL time 250 ms 581 ms
Uploaded data 24026 bytes 27009 bytes
Downloaded data 1310201 bytes 1315904 bytes
Table 12: The time and size for a Chromium request (page global data) for eztv.ch.
The diﬀerence between the schemes mainly lie in the uploaded and downloaded
data. Each retransmitted packet on Chromium between the client and the server
increments the stats reﬂecting the diﬀerence in the downloaded and uploaded data
from the HAR ﬁle. Overall, the browsing experience for both the schemes is very
similar.
Data volume overhead: The data volume overhead for a middlebox in Triraksha is
from the TLS secrets received by client. The memory consumption on the middlebox
would increase with the number of TLS connections. For each TLS connection, the
secrets consists of 56-64 bytes. The TLS secrets are send in a separate connection and
take only a few bytes of disk space. There is no size diﬀerence between the Triraksha
handshake and a regular TLS handshake; however, data volume overhead exists from
the retransmission of packets (cannot be quantiﬁed due to its variable nature).
Data throughput: The data throughput for our scheme ideally should be the same
as for a regular TLS connection. However, the number of connections is limited by the
resources on the middlebox. With our current implementation setup, the modiﬁed
version of Wireshark can decrypt upto approximately 5000 Curl requests around
which and after Wireshark experiences memory crashes. We made Curl requests to
a list of Alexa’s top 10000 websites. After a number of runs for this experiment, we
1Machine conﬁguration for the proof of concept is in the Appendix.
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observed that Wireshark is stable upto 5000 connections.
CPU overhead: Triraksha performs worse compared to Split TLS and other schemes
when it comes to CPU overhead. The scripts run to achieve the intermediate steps in
Triraksha are event and I/O driven. The resources used by the scripts are minimal,
however, the main source of CPU overhead is attributed to the resources consumed by
Wireshark. Wireshark is used for the generation of TLS secrets on the client end and
as a decryption engine at the middlebox end. Wireshark uses signiﬁcant memory as
it frequently updates a GUI component, captures packets and dissects them. Further,
Wireshark dissectors do not run in a multi-threaded environment. Using Wireshark
on the client is a tradeoﬀ between deployability and resource consumption. Modify-
ing the browser or underlying SSL library to leak the TLS secrets would result in the
enterprise to adopt only that version of the browser/SSL library. Patches for every
update to browsers/SSL library would have to be made and this would increase the
load on the administrators of the network.
On the middlebox end, Wireshark is used to provide access to the plain text. The
overhead of resource consumption by Wireshark for decrypting packets would increase
linearly with the number of connections made by the client and the size of the TLS
packets. In a production environment where resources for the middleboxes are higher,
we do not recommend to run Wireshark to capture data for long periods as Wireshark
may itself suﬀer from memory leaks or other vulnerabilities.
Triraksha design does not implicate high CPU overhead. In practice, any other
software which uses less CPU resources can be used for generation of TLS secrets/as
a decryption engine. Wireshark provides a neat way to see the network log in a
GUI (which helped us perform debugging and evaluation), but in practice, the GUI
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is not really required for the functionality. We alternatively use the command line
version TShark which can also achieve the same functionality as Wireshark and uses
signiﬁcantly lesser resources. TShark does not fork a separate child process to handle
capture of packets like in Wireshark and does not have a GUI component. We apply




Discussion and extensions to
Triraksha
In this chapter, we discuss a possible extension for Triraksha to perform MAC veriﬁ-
cation for the decrypted payload in a connection and how Triraksha handles Authen-
ticated Encryption with Associated Data ciphers (AEAD).
5.1 TLS 1.3 and AEAD ciphers
5.1.1 TLS 1.3
TLS has a long history of vulnerabilities based on implementation and cryptographic
security. The IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) has been developing TLS 1.3
standard which would be the defacto standard for cryptographic protocols in the
TLS family. While the changelog extends to signiﬁcant improvements like improv-
ing round trip times (RTT) for protocol messages, removing compression, improving
downgrade protection, adding a full handshake signature etc., we are interested in
the improved and robust crypto standard provided by TLS 1.3. TLS 1.3 removes
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obsolete and insecure standards for cryptographic primitives. In short, all primi-
tives that would lead to a weak TLS conﬁguration are being removed For example,
RC4, DES, 3DES, EXPORT-strength ciphers, weak and rarely-used elliptic curves,
AES-CBC, MD5, and SHA-1 are no longer part of TLS 1.3. The current list of cipher
suites in TLS 1.3 is subject to AEAD ciphers, mainly: AES-GCM, AES-CCM, ARIA-
GCM, Camellia-GCM, ChaCha/Poly. Besides this, TLS 1.3 does not support the old
static RSA handshake without Diﬃe Hellman as the static RSA handshake does not
support perfect forward secrecy. TLS 1.3 removes explicit nonces and support for
re-negotiation.
5.1.2 AEAD ciphers
Given the release updates in the TLS 1.3 draft, Triraksha should support the upcom-
ing TLS protocol. However, Triraksha does not work well with AEAD ciphers. We
discuss this and introduce AEAD ciphers here.
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) is a form of encryption
which provides conﬁdentiality, integrity, and authenticity assurances on the plaintext.
Authenticated encryption (AE) schemes are typically constructed by combining an
encryption scheme and a message authentication code (MAC). Approaches to such
schemes involve Encrypt then MAC or MAC then encrypt. AE schemes have evolved
to use encryption and MAC under a single interface for use with block ciphers. An
example of this approach is GCM (Galois counter mode). For the purpose of this
section, we are interested in the AEAD ciphers that encrypt and MAC under a single
interface and are supported by TLS 1.3. These ciphers involve the following schemes:
CCM, OCB, GCM, EAX etc. OCM is a strong AEAD cipher, but is patented and
is legally challenging to use in practice. CCM is a two-pass mode and does not work
well for streaming applications like Netﬂix and Twitch. GCM is a popular cipher and
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is well known for its performance and eﬃciency as it parallelizable. It is commonly
used in SSL/TLS. The strength of AE implies IND-CCA2 (in-distinguishability under
adaptive chosen ciphertext attack) and NM-CCA2 (non-malleability under adaptive
chosen ciphertext attack) security.
We shall now describe the functioning for GCM, why it does not work with Tri-
raksha and how to tweak it such that it can be incorporated in our scheme.
GCM and GMAC: GCM is a mode of operation for symmetric key cryptographic
block ciphers to provide data encryption and authentication. Galois Message Authen-
tication Code (GMAC) is an authentication-only variant of the GCM which can be
used as an incremental message authentication code. Figure 7 represents the working
of GCM.
GCM has two operations [56]: authenticated encryption and authenticated de-
cryption. The authenticated encryption takes the following inputs:
1. A secret key K.
2. An initialization vector IV of length 1 and 264 bits. IV should be unique for
each key.
3. Plain text P for which encryption is performed.
4. AD (Additional data) The data is authenticated but not encrypted. Length of
AD can be 0 and 264 bits.
There are two outputs:
1. A cipher text C (length is equal to plaintext P).
2. An authentication tag.
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Figure 7: Internal functioning of the GCM encryption operation.
The authenticated decryption operation has ﬁve inputs: K, IV , C, AD, and T.
It has only a single output which is the plaintext value P or a symbol ‘FAIL’ that
represents that the MAC failed for the input values. The AD is used to protect
additional information that needs to be protected, for example, in a network protocol
AD can be the IP address and port numbers. When the length of the plain text is
zero, GCM acts as a MAC on AD. This mode is called GMAC. The IV acts as a
nonce that is to be unique for each invocation of the encryption operation for a ﬁxed
key. For example in TLS, the IV is split into two parts: the implicit salt (4 bytes,
generated in handshake, not changed in the whole session) and a explicit nonce of 8
bytes, chosen by the sender and carried in each SSL record (usually the TLS sequence
number for a record). The combination of the implicit salt and the explicit nonce
makes the IV unique. The two main functions used in GCM are the block cipher
encryption and multiplication over the ﬁeld GF(2128).
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Issue with GCM and Triraksha: The issue with using GCM in Triraksha with
minimal write permissions is that the MAC key is not revealed to the middlebox, only
the decryption key; however, in GCM the MAC key (which is GHASH0 in Figure 7) is
derived from the decryption key (which isK). Speciﬁcally GHASH0 = Enck(000 . . . 0).
Thus by revealing K, you eﬀectively reveal GHASH0. There is no security reason
that the MAC key needs to computable from the decryption key, however GCM
does require that only one key is passed into the encryption/decryption operations.
Therefore, we suggest two solutions that would change the internal functioning of
GCM in a way that would allow Triraksha, as well as any other application where
one might want to selectively disclose sub-keys to allow only reading or only writing
to ciphertexts.
1. Consider the input key to GCM. Call it MK, for master key, instead of K in
Figure 7. We use MK to derive two independent subkeys using a counter: an
encryption key and a MAC key. Speciﬁcally: K = Encmk(000 . . . 0) (encryption
on counter 0) and GHASH0 = Encmk(000 . . . 1) (encryption on counter 1). See
Figure 8. This comes at the expense of an additional encryption (e.g., AES)
operation. We share only the new encryption key with the middlebox.
2. Alternatively to avoid the addition of an extra encryption operation, we could
simply swap the roles of K and GHASH0. The key supplied to the GCM oper-
ation could be consider the MAC key and thus GHASH0, while the value derived
from it can be considered the encryption key. Speciﬁcally,K = EncGHASH0(000 . . . 0).
We share only the new encryption key with the middlebox.
GCM is used in two modes: encryption/decryption with authentication and GMAC
(only authentication). We argue that both the approaches do not break GCM when it
is used to do encryption/decryption operations or when used in GMAC mode. We do
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Figure 8: Deriving two keys from MK in GCM.
not make any changes to the way GCM performs encryption or MAC authentication.
The only changes we make to GCM involve deriving values for the encryption key and
the MAC key (which would be used for the block cipher encryption of the plaintext)
or swapping the value of the MAC key and the encryption key after the MAC key is
generated.
We also note that in this case Triraksha would not be server compatible as the
server would also have to be modiﬁed to use the same TLS library as used by the
client. The TLS library would have to be modiﬁed to support both the approaches.
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5.2 Veriﬁcation of TLS secrets and integrity of data
using MAC
Our current threat model allows the middlebox to trust the TLS secrets provided by
the client. Consider a model where we have a ‘malicious’ user who tries to bypass the
Triraksha protocol. The malicious user can simply send the middlebox bad/wrong
TLS secrets. The client can communicate messages with the server and the middle-
box would simply decrypt the traﬃc with the wrong TLS secrets resulting in garbage
decryption. We extend the Triraksha threat model to handle a malicious user. Under
this model, we let the middlebox perform MAC veriﬁcation for the decrypted text.
The middlebox can then detect if the TLS secrets provided by the client are correct.
The extended model only helps in detection for integrity of data. A middlebox oper-
ator would be aware if MAC veriﬁcations fails for the decrypted plaintext. We do not
support prevention at the middlebox end; that is, even on MAC veriﬁcation failure
for the TLS application data packets, we let TLS application data packets for that
connection to pass through (MAC veriﬁcation is done only after packets pass through
the middlebox).
The extended model lets the middlebox trust the client for a grace period until it
receives the master secret for the TLS connections recorded by Wireshark. Wireshark
can use the master secret to verify integrity of the symmetric encryption keys and
the data by performing MAC veriﬁcation. The MAC key derived from the master
secret will authenticate the payload of the TLS application data packets. The process
described above uses the GUI functionality provided by Wireshark to reload the
SSLKEYLOGFILE. This runs the TLS dissector code again decrypting the captured
packets based on the master secret provided in the new SSLKEYLOGFILE.
Under our threat model, the middlebox can introspect data but is not capable
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of modifying it. We provide the master secret to the middlebox only when we know
that a TLS connection has ended or after it is re-negotiated. The latter approach,
which is to induce re-negotiations allowing us to set a grace time period after which
a connection would be renegotiated. By inducing forced re-negotiations for TLS
connections after a given time period we can give the middlebox the master secret.
The new negotiated handshake would have a diﬀerent master secret for the client
and the server. The middlebox can no longer have access to the correct MAC key
for the current TLS connection and can perform MAC veriﬁcation for the previously
recorded data with the old master secret provided by the client. Re-negotiation in
TLS usually happens in the client when:
1. The server requires a re-negotiation, typically because the client tries to access
a resource which requires a client certiﬁcate which the previous handshake did
not include; or
2. A re-negotiation is done for security reasons after some time or number of bytes
transferred. In OpenSSL, this can be tuned with BIO set ssl re-negotiate bytes
and BIO set ssl re-negotiate timeout; or
3. The 64-bit TLS sequence number overﬂows.
Since we do not make changes at the server end, we leave it to the application
developer using Triraksha to recompile the underlying TLS library/application to set
a re-negotiation time out period. With TLS 1.3, re-negotiation for TLS sessions are
no longer supported. In this case, we only provide the master secret to the middlebox
when the TLS connection has ended. In our implementation, we track the state of
a TLS connection by detecting TCP FIN packets. Whenever the client detects a
TCP FIN packet, it means the connection has ended and the client can share the
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master secret with the middlebox. The middlebox would then use the master secret
to perform MAC veriﬁcation of previously recorded data.
5.3 Extending Triraksha use cases and a note on
usability
In Triraksha, the client and the server continue to main integrity for messages sent
between them. The Triraksha middlebox is limited in its use cases. The middlebox
cannot perform functionality like compression and cache which requires modiﬁcation
of the traﬃc sent between the client and the server. The Triraksha protocol can be
extended such that we also share the MAC key with the middlebox. This enables
the Triraksha middlebox to be used in other scenarios as well. We suggest to make
this decision only when the middlebox is trusted and perceptible by the client and
the server. A consequence to this decision would be that the middlebox can now
modify the traﬃc in a connection and the client and server would loose integrity for
the messages between them.
Triraksha is presented as a scheme that provides client side consent to the mid-
dlebox. In practice, Triraksha can be modiﬁed to provide server side consent to the
middlebox. While we do not list the speciﬁcs, the concept remains similar. The
server would leak TLS secrets to the middlebox instead of the client. This enables
the Triraksha middlebox to be used as a reverse proxy or a load balancer.
Scalability compared to Split TLS and possible improvements: The Tri-
raksha middlebox ideally can handle equal or more number of clients compared to
Split TLS. Relative to Split TLS, for each connection in Split TLS, the middlebox
needs to open 2 sockets for connections between the client and the server and the
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client and the middlebox. In Triraksha, the middlebox needs to open 2 sockets: one
for handling the TLS secrets from the client and one for forwarding packets between
the client and the server.
In some RFCs, the TLS session encryption key/TLS secrets (encrypted with the
middlebox’s public key assuming RSA encryption key in middlebox’s cert) is included
in an ignorable header ﬁeld in the TLS packet header itself. The header is added
after a certain point in the handshake or after knowing the TLS encryption key and
is packed into the TLS packet and parsed by the middlebox. The packet is parsed
before it reaches the server. With Triraksha, this kind of a scheme design (which would
involve opening only a single socket respective to a connection on the middlebox) can
be explored to improve scalability.
Usability conﬁguration for end user and middlebox: In Triraksha, usability
for the end user and the middlebox administrator can be achieved by setting policies.
The objective for setting such policies is to communicate to the user ‘who can do
what’ in a simple and scalable manner. The policy communicates if a middlebox can
read/write the user’s data?
At the client end, for each website/group of websites, an user can set a policy such
that the middlebox would be allowed:
1. No read permission: The client does not leak the TLS secrets in this case.
2. Only read permission: The client leaks the TLS secrets to the middlebox.
3. Read and write permissions: The client includes the MAC key with the TLS
secrets used in Triraksha and leaks the TLS secrets to the middlebox.
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Similarly the middlebox can be conﬁgured to have a central policy to allow/block
websites. Further, a policy can be conﬁgured on the middlebox for a website/group
of websites such that:
1. The middlebox does not intercept the connection. The middlebox would not
block TLS application data packets for this website and does not require the
TLS secrets from the client.
2. The middlebox requires to inspect packet payload. The middlebox follows the
Triraksha protocol and requires the client to leak the TLS secrets.
3. The middlebox requires read and write privileges over the traﬃc. The client
would have to include the MAC key with the TLS secrets and leak it to the
middlebox.
A note on the browser security indicator: HTTPS over the years has matured
and integrated with popular browsers visualizing to the user if the connection is
trusted or not. Browsers are one of the most popular applications used by a user for
making TLS connections to a server. A standard HTTP with SSL connection in a
browser is graphically shown to the user with a lock icon. The intended goal of using
the lock icon is to provide the user with the identity of page origin and indicate to
the user that page contents are not viewed or modiﬁed by a third party. However,
displaying the origin ID in the padlock is not always helpful as origin ID can easily
be manipulative and provide the user with similar looking origins. Using the padlock
icon tells the user that all the elements are fetched from a trusted server. Trust is reify
by performing security validations like if the HTTPS certiﬁcate is issued by a CA that
is trusted by the browser, if the HTTPS certiﬁcate is valid and if the common name
in the certiﬁcate matches the domain name in the URL. Most browsers recognize
EV (extended validation) certiﬁcates which are designed for large scale banks and
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e-commerce websites. EV certiﬁcates provide the strongest encryption level available
and enable the organization behind a website to present its own veriﬁed identity
to website visitors and help block semantic attacks (phishing etc). A green colored
address bar is shown in browsers for the usage of EV certiﬁcates.
The visual cues for SSL (lock icon and green colored bar) sometimes do not not
reﬂect their intended purpose and fail to show the user, the trust of the connection.
There are number of attacks [76] identiﬁed by researchers on a SSL connection that
can trick the user to have a false sense of security while having the padlock icon
shown to them. SSL strip is one such attack in which an attacker can redirect the
server address to the attacker’s page where he can use similar looking lock icons on
the website instead of the address bar and trick a gullible user to enter his credentials.
There can be semantic attacks on certiﬁcates where the attacker can buy a certiﬁcate
for a domain looking similar to the legitimate domain name. The user may be tricked
into thinking he is visiting a legitimate website. Sometimes when certiﬁcates are
invalid and there are pop up warnings in the browser, user often ignore these warnings
thinking of it as a misconﬁguration rather than an attack. It takes as much as 4-6
mouse clicks to accept invalid certiﬁcates in some of the browsers. In the case of a
server sending mixed content (HTTP and HTTPS), the padlock icon is modiﬁed to
show a ‘!’ along with the lock icon for Firefox. Safari does not detect mixed content
and no warnings or prompts are issued to the user. In a MITM attack the user can be
easily tricked into accepting a certiﬁcate from the attacker. The user would still be
shown a padlock icon and conﬁdentiality is no longer maintained. Joshual et al. [76] in
his paper does an empirical study of SSL warning eﬀectiveness. They recommend to
block users from making unsafe connections rather than displaying warnings in benign
situations. Schechter et al. [68] perform an evaluation of website authentication and
conclude that users enter credentials even when the passive HTTPS indicators are
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absent. They also conclude that authenticated website lookalike images make users
disregard other security indicators.
Designing an interface for browsers: Browsers are one of the most popular TLS
applications. There is a need for browsers to have some kind of a security indicator
to visualize to the user the existence of a middlebox and to indicate trust for the
connections. Reusing the padlock seems to further mislead users and fails to indicate
if the connection is ‘secure’. In the proposal: any node refusal, the author suggests
to use a double padlock icon, each lock displaying a secure connection for the server
and a middlebox. We leave designing a satisfactory ‘connection security indicator’
for browser as future work.
Security indicator for Triraksha: Other common user applications which make
TLS connections on a general note do not have a connection security indicator and
do not display trust for the connection to the user (example: Spotify, Skype etc.).
With Triraksha, we envision a ‘VPN style indicator’ where the OS is aware if the TLS
connection is being proxied. A simple interface (example: button, notiﬁcation) can
indicate if the client is sending TLS secrets for a connection. This extends visibility
for the connection security indicator to all applications and not just the browsers.
An OS level security indicator can support application layer gateways as well as
proxies (the latter approach of using a padlock icon works only for middleboxes that
act as proxies). We leave designing a satisfactory ‘connection security indicator’ for




Middlebox are increasingly being deployed by organizations and provide a wide array
of valuable in-network services. Simultaneously, end-to-end encryption is adopted
increasingly across the Internet. Middleboxes do not work well with end-to-end en-
crypted sessions. The naive and popular solution Split TLS breaks end-to-end encryp-
tion and is not secure. While, there are other models that incorporate middleboxes
with end-to-end encryption, they are not adopted as they are not easy to deploy in
the real world. These schemes have varying threat models and their end goals are
not aligned with the deployment needs of users and service providers.
In this work, we introduce a benchmark based on the UDS framework that encom-
passes the threat models, entities and properties of the schemes and provides a clear
insight into the challenges and needs of using middleboxes with end-to-end encrypted
sessions. We introduce our scheme Triraksha which provides a packet inspection ser-
vice for TLS connections. Triraksha design and implementation highlights challenges
for a real world deployable scheme. We hope that researchers will continue to explore
the standing problem of enabling end-to-end encryption with middleboxes for future
versions of the TLS protocol.
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7.1 TLS Message Header Values





Listing 7.2: TLS version header values
SSL3 x ‘0300 ’
TLS1 x ‘0301 ’
TLS1.1 x ‘0302 ’
TLS1.2 x ‘0303 ’
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Listing 7.3: TLS handshake message format
Byte 0 TLS record type = 22
Bytes 1-2 TLS version
Bytes 3-4 TLS Length of data in the record (excluding the
header itself).
Byte 5 TLS Handshake type (Value 0 for Client/Value 1
for Server)
Bytes 6-8 TLS Length of data to follow in this record
Bytes 9-n TLS Command -specific data
Listing 7.4: Format of a TLS record
Byte 0 TLS record type
Bytes 1-2 TLS version (major/minor)
Bytes 3-4 Length of data in the record (excluding the
header itself).
The maximum SSL supports is 16384 (16K).
7.2 Entities and deﬁnitions
The following terms are used in paper and are deﬁned as follows:
1. User: A user is the human being who controls and initiates the use of an user-
agent/client.
2. User-agent/Client: The client is a program run in a computer by the user and
is responsible for starting a TLS/SSL session with a service provider/server.
Client and user-agents are synonyms. A client is also one of the endpoints in a
TLS/SSL connection.
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3. Server/Service-provider: The server is a networking computer that completes
the requests of a client and responds back with data. A server is the other
endpoint in a TLS/SSL connection. Service-provider and server are synonyms.
4. Middlebox/Proxy: A middlebox is a generalized term for a networking device
that intercepts traﬃc between a client and a server and uses it for purposes like
inspection, manipulation, packet forwarding, caching, compression etc. Middle-
box and proxy are synonyms for the purpose of this paper.
5. Transparent proxy: A proxy that uses Split TLS. A networking device that
intercepts the traﬃc between a client and a server. This proxy acts on behalf
of the client by adding a trusted root certiﬁcate on the user’s device. Such a
proxy is transparent to both the end points during a TLS/SSL session. The
user himself may install the certiﬁcate on the device, an adversary may trick
the user into installing the certiﬁcate or the certiﬁcate is already present in the
device installed by the manufacturer.
6. Reverse proxy: A proxy interposed by the server (such as gateway or portal) is
called as a reverse proxy.
7. End-to-end encryption: Encryption of data between two entities with no inter-
mediates in the connection.
8. User-consent/user-permissions: The explicit grant provided by an user resulting
in the trust of a particular component. The user may or may not be aware of
this grant. User consent and user-permissions are synonyms.
9. Middlebox service: The functionality done by the middlebox.
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7.3 Machine conﬁguration for Triraksha implemen-
tation
Conﬁguration for client and middlebox machine: Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2000 2.3 Ghz,
1 Tb HDD, 8 Gb RAM. Speed for USB to ethernet adapter: USB 2.0 to 100 Mb/sec.
7.4 Deﬁnitions for Curl APIs
We leverage Curl’s inbuilt timing API’s to record logistics for one Curl request. The
following APIs are used for our evaluation of Triraksha.
1. time namelookup: The time, in seconds, it took from the start until the name
resolving was completed.
2. time connect: The time, in seconds, it took from the start until the TCP connect
to the remote host (or proxy) was completed.
3. time appconnect: The time, in seconds, it took from the start until the SS-
L/TCP/etc connect/handshake to the remote host was completed.
4. time pretransfer: The time, in seconds, it took from the start until the ﬁle
transfer was just about to begin. This includes all pre-transfer commands and
negotiations that are speciﬁc to the particular protocol(s) involved.
5. time starttransfer: The time, in seconds, it took from the start until the ﬁrst
byte was just about to be transferred. This includes time pretransfer and also
the time the server needed to calculate the result.
6. time total: The total time, in seconds, that the full operation lasted. The time
will be displayed with millisecond resolution.
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7. size header: The total amount of bytes of the downloaded headers.
8. size download: The total amount of bytes that were downloaded.
7.5 Deﬁnitions for Chrome’s HAR ﬁle
We leverage the Chrome developer tools to record logistics for web requests made
with the browser. The deﬁnitions for the parameters recorded are:
1. Number of requests: The number of requests made to the principal webserver.
2. Wait time: This is the amount of time waiting for the server to respond.
3. Recieve time: This is the amount of time used for the server to transfer the
required information to the client.
4. On load time: Total time taken for the page to be fully loaded, inclusive of
AJAX calls or any REST calls from Javascript to populate data on external
server.
5. SSL time: The time it took for the SSL handshake to complete.
6. Uploaded data: The total amount of bytes of the uploaded requests.
7. Downloaded data: The total amount of bytes that were downloaded from the
response.
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